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Abstract
If agents cooperate only within small groups of some bounded sizes, is there a way
to partition the population into small groups such that no collection of agents can do
better by forming a new group? This paper revisited f-core in a transferable utility
setting. By providing a new formulation to the problem, we built up a link between f-
core and the transportation theory. Such a link helps us to establish an exact existence
result, and a characterization result of f-core for a general class of agents, as well as
some improvements in computing the f-core in the finite type case.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we study a continuum of players form small groups in order to share
group surpluses. Group sizes are bounded by natural numbers or percentiles, and group
surpluses are determined by the types of its members. We wish to know whether there
is a stable state in this game: that is, whether we can partition the continuum of players
into small groups such that agents have a way to share group surpluses and no coalition
of players can do better by forming a new group. We use the term stable assignments to
denote such partitions. Therefore, our question is whether a stable assignment exists.
It is worth noting that when the group size is exactly two, the problem is a (roommate)
matching problem.
∗I am indebted to Truman Bewley, John Geanakopolos, Xiangliang Li and Larry Samuelson for inspiring
discussions and their encouragements. I am grateful to Ian Ball, Laura Doval, Michael Greinecker, Ryota
Iijima, Masaki Miyashita, Allen Wong, Weijie Zhong and participants at conferences and seminars for helpful
comments. I am responsible for all remaining mistakes and typos. First version: March 2017.
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In the literature, there are some partial answers to the question we posed: when
group sizes are bounded by natural numbers, Kaneko and Wooders [1996] proved an
approximately stable assignment exists1. It is only known that the approximation
notion can be dropped when the continuum of players share a finite number of types2.
When group sizes are bounded by percentiles, Schmeidler [1972a] proved, in exchange
economies, core allocations are not blocked by any group of epsilon sizes. However,
this observation alone will not lead to the existence of a stable assignment, since core
allocations cannot be achieved by reallocation in small groups.
As a result, to my knowledge, when group sizes are bounded by either natural
numbers or percentiles, there is no existence result for general models. To make matters
worse, even though we know the existence of a stable assignment when group sizes are
finitely bounded and the type space is finite, it is not computationally feasible to use
the current method, linear programming, to find a stable assignment, as the number of
group types becomes astronomical even when group sizes are very small. For example,
when there are 1000 types of players and every group contains up to 4 players, there are∑4
n=1
((
1000
n
)) ∼ 4.2× 1010 types of groups in this game. If we use linear programming
to find a stable assignment, we need to solve a maximization problem with 4.2 × 1010
unknowns, which is not a feasible task computationally.
In this paper, conceptually, we prove the existence of a stable assignment for gen-
eral type spaces and general surplus functions, when group sizes are bounded by either
natural numbers or percentiles. Furthermore, when group sizes are bounded by nat-
ural numbers, our work provides a parallel yet simpler formulation for the classical
assignment problem; when group sizes are bounded by percentiles, our model is new.
Computationally, when there are finitely many types of agents in the market, our
method provides the computational feasibility for finding stable assignments by reduc-
ing the number of unknowns from about |I|N , in linear programming, to about |I|,
where |I| is the number of types, N is maximum group size and |I| is much larger than
N . In particular, for games with 1000 types of players and group sizes are up to 4,
our method reduces the number of unknowns in the maximization problem from about
4.2× 1010 to 25000.3
Methodologically, we prove the existence results by connecting the stability prob-
lem to a multi- or “continuum”- marginal transport problem. For games with finite-size
groups, our key observation is that any stable assignment can be identified by a sym-
metric transport plan in some replicated agent spaces. When the maximum group size
1In their definition of stable assignment, there is an additional approximate feasibility condition. In
addition, their framework is for games with non-transferable utility. In this paper, when we mention their
work, we talk about the application of their result to a game with transferable utility.
2See Wooders [2012] for a proof.
3See Section 2.5.2 for more details.
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is N , we replicate the agents space N ! many times. We choose the number N ! as any
group, containing no more than N players, can be represented by a vector of length
N ! via replications. As a consequence of our observation, we are able to reformulate
the welfare maximization problem as a symmetric transport problem. This reformula-
tion helps us in two ways. First, the duality theorem of the multi-marginal transport
problems helps us prove the existence of a stable assignment. Second, as Friesecke
and Vogler [2018] pointed out, the symmetric structure created by our identification
trick helps us reduce the number of unknowns. For games with positive-size groups,
we prove the existence of a stable assignment by extending Kantorovich-Koopmans’
duality theorem to a “continuum”-marginal setting.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we study games with finite-size
groups. In Section 3, we study games with positive-size groups. We review related
literature at the end of each section. In Section 4, we summarize our results.
2 Games with Finite-Size Groups
In this section, we study transferable utility games with a continuum of agents who form
small groups in order to share group surpluses. Group sizes are bounded by natural
numbers. We use a natural number N ≥ 2 to denote the upper bound on group sizes
and a natural number N ′ ≤ N to denote the lower bound on group sizes.
This section is organized as follows. In Section 2.1, we describe the model. In
Section 2.2, we state our results. In Section 2.3, we prove our results. In Section 2.4,
we study four examples. In Section 2.5, we discuss three applications of our results.
Lastly, in Section 2.6, we review the literature.
2.1 Model
We study a cooperative (transferable utility) game denoted by the tuple ((I, µ), s,N ′, N).
Here, the natural numbers N ′ and N correspond to the lower and the upper bound on
group sizes.
2.1.1 Type Space
The type space of players is summarized by a measure space (I, µ). In particular, the
set I is a compact metric space4 representing a set of players’ types. The measure
µ ∈M+(I) is a non-negative finite Borel measure on I representing the distribution of
players’ types.
4The compactness of the type space can be relaxed with no essential changes in the rest of the paper. See
Section 2.2.2 for more details.
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There are two canonical examples of the type space. Firstly, I is a finite set and µ
is an |I|-dimensional real vector with positive entries. In this finite type case, the i-th
coordinate of µ, µ(i) > 0, denotes the mass of type i players in this game. We will use
the finite type case to explain some definitions in the following subsections. Secondly, I
is the unit interval [0, 1] and µ is some probability measure on I with or without atoms.
2.1.2 Groups
Groups are the units in which players interact with each other. Since we only distinguish
players according to their types, we can only distinguish groups according to group
types. To be simple, we abuse the language by calling group types groups.
Formally, for any permitted group size n ∈ N such that N ′ ≤ n ≤ N , the set of
n-person groups Gn consists of all multisets of cardinality n with elements taken from
I. That is,
Gn =
{
G : I → N
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈I
G(i) = n
}
5
In any n-person group G ∈ Gn, there are G(i) type i players, for any type i ∈ I.
The set of groups G consists of all groups of permitted sizes. Therefore,
G =
N⋃
n=N ′
Gn
Naturally, a group is an element in G. All groups in this section consist of finitely many
types of players. Groups consisting of infinitely many types of players will be discussed
in Section 3.
Next, we identify n-person groups by the equivalence classes on the product space
In. For any natural number n ≥ 2, we define an equivalence relation ∼n on In: for any
type lists (i1, ..., in), (j1, ..., jn) ∈ In,
(i1, ..., in) ∼n (j1, ..., jn)⇐⇒ jk = iσ(k) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n, for some permutation σ ∈ Sn
That is, two type lists (i1, ..., in), (j1, ..., jn) in I
n are equivalent if they are the same
up to some index permutation. It is easy to verify there is a bijection between the set
of n-person groups Gn and the set of equivalence classes In/ ∼n6. i.e. Gn ' In/ ∼n.
Therefore, we write an n-person group G ∈ Gn as
G = [i1, ..., in]
5 Implicitly, for any function G ∈ Gn, G has nonzero values at most finitely many points in I. That is,
the support of G, supp(G) = {i ∈ I : G(i) 6= 0}, is a finite set. The summation ∑i∈I G(i) is thus defined as∑
i∈supp(G)G(i).
6The bijective map is defined by T : In/ ∼n→ Gn such that T ([i1, ..., in]) = G, where G : I → N is defined
by G(i) = |{1 ≤ k ≤ n : ik = i}| for all i ∈ I.
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by listing all its members’ types with repetitions. By identifying n-person groups by
equivalence classes In/ ∼n, we know Gn is metrizable under the quotient topology.7.
In the finite type case, our model can be described in the language of hypergraph
theory: the type set I corresponds to vertices of a hypergraph, and the set of n-person
groups Gn corresponds to n-uniform hyperedges in the hypergraph. It is well known
that the number of n-person groups, or n-uniform hyperedges, is given by,
|Gn| =
(( |I|
n
))
=
(|I|+ n− 1
n
)
=
(|I|+ n− 1)!
n!(|I| − 1)! (1)
In particular, for any fixed group size n, there are Θ(In) types of n-person groups.
2.1.3 Surplus Function
A surplus function specifies the total amount of surplus group members can share.
Formally, a surplus function s is a non-negative valued function on the set of groups G.
Its restriction on Gn, sn = s|Gn , is a surplus function on n-person groups. We impose
the following assumption on the surplus function:
(A1) for any permitted group size N ′ ≤ n ≤ N , sn is continuous in Gn8. i.e. for any
[ik1, ..., i
k
n]→ [i1, ..., in] in Gn,
lim
k→∞
sn([i
k
1, ..., i
k
n]) = sn([i1, ..., in)])
Assumption (A1) assumes, for any permitted group size n, the surplus function on
n-person groups is continuous. In the finite type case, this assumption impose no
restriction on the surplus function.
In addition, we remark that we assume no relation between surplus functions on
different group sizes. In particular, the surplus function need not be super-additive: the
departure of an agent from a group might increase the surplus of the remaining group
members. The non super-additivity helps us to analyze examples such as exchange
economies with consumption externalities9.
2.1.4 Assignments
An assignment is a partition of the continuum of players into groups of permitted sizes.
Rather than studying the partition directly, we define an assignment by a statistical
representation of the partition, in which the mass of each group in the partition is
7See Appendix B.1 for a proof.
8The continuity assumption can be replaced by an upper semi-continuity assumption with no essential
changes on the rest of this paper. See Section 2.2.2 for more details.
9An example is given in Section 2.4.4.
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specified. By using this statistical representation, we simplify the classical definition of
assignment in the literature10 and also obtain some measure structure in the definition.
To describe this statistical representation, we first need to explore the structure of
Gn, the set of n-person groups. In particular, we will define a collection of partitions
of Gn: for every measurable subset A ⊂ I and every natural number 0 ≤ k ≤ n, the
set Gn(A, k) is defined to be a set consisting of all n-person groups in which there are
k agents whose types are in the set A. That is,
Gn(A, k) =
{
G ∈ Gn :
∑
i∈A
G(i) = k
}
11
It is routine to check that, for every measurable A ⊂ I, {Gn(A, k) : 0 ≤ k ≤ n} is a
partition of Gn. That is, the collection of partitions we defined is {{Gn(A, k) : 0 ≤ k ≤
n} : measurable A ⊂ I}. Moreover, Gn(A, k) is a measurable set in Gn = In/ ∼n.12.
Now, we define assignments. An assignment is a tuple τ = (τN ′ , ..., τN ), where τn
is a non-negative measure on Gn satisfying the following consistency condition: for any
measurable A ⊂ I,
N∑
n=N ′
n∑
k=0
kτn(Gn(A, k)) = µ(A) (2)
In this equation, τn(Gn(A, k)) is the total mass of all n-person groups containing exactly
k players whose types are in A. Thus, kτn(Gn(A, k)) is the total mass of players, whose
types are in A, that are assigned to some n-person groups containing exactly k players
whose types are in set A. Summing over k,
∑n
k=0 kτn(Gn(A, k)) is the total mass of
players, whose types are in A, that are assigned to some n-person groups. Therefore,∑N
n=N ′
∑n
k=0 kτn(Gn(A, k)) is the total mass of players, whose types are in A, that are
assigned by the assignment. Since all players need to be assigned by the assignment,
this total mass is equal to µ(A), which is the total mass of players whose types are in
set A. Consequently, the consistency condition means all players are assigned to some
group in the partition specified by the assignment.
In the finite type case, an assignment is a vector τ with |G| non-negative real entries.
For any group G ∈ G, τ(G) is the mass of group G in the partition represented by τ .
10In Kaneko and Wooders [1986] and Kaneko and Wooders [1996], a partition p of the player space I is
defined to be measure-consistent if there is a partition of I into N measurable sets I1, ..., IN and each set In
has a partition, consisting of measurable subsets {In1, ..., Inn}, with the following property: there are measure
preserving isomorphisms ψn1, ..., ψnn from In1 to In1, ..., Inn, respectively, such that ψn1 is the identity map
and {ψn1, ..., ψnn} ∈ p for all i ∈ Ik1.
11Similar to Footnote 5,
∑
i∈AG(i) is defined to be
∑
i∈A∩supp(G)G(i).
12See Appendix B.2 for a proof.
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In this case, the consistency condition is: for any type i ∈ I,
N∑
k=0
∑
G∈G(i,k)
kτ(G) = µ(i)
where G(i, k) is the set of groups containing exactly k type i players.
We finish this subsubsection by defining the following notions.
Firstly, we use a set T to denote the set of assignments. That is,
T =
{
τ = (τn)N ′≤n≤N : τn ∈M+(Gn), ∀n,
N∑
n=N ′
n∑
k=0
kτn(Gn(A, k)) = µ(A), ∀A ⊂ I
}
Secondly, given any group G = [i1, ..., in], we say a type i agent is in group G,
written as i ∈ G, if i = ik for some 1 ≤ k ≤ n. In this case, a type i agent in group G
has a group partner (or a trade partner) of type im, for all m 6= k.
Thirdly, given any assignment τ ∈ T, we say a group G ∈ G is formed, or is a formed
group, under assignment τ if G ∈ supp(τ) = ∪Nn=N ′supp(τn). In the finite type case,
a group is a formed group under assignment τ if and only if τ(G) > 0. i.e. there is a
positive mass of group G in the partition represented by assignment τ .
2.1.5 Stability
In the game, players form small groups in order to share group surplus. We say an
assignment is stable if there is a way to split group surpluses such that no group of
agents can jointly do better by forming a new group.
Formally, an assignment τ ∈ T is stable if there is an imputation u ∈ L1(I, µ)
satisfying the following two conditions:
1. Feasibility:
∑
i∈G u(i) ≤ s(G)13, for all formed groups G ∈ supp(τ)
2. No-blocking:
∑
i∈G u(i) ≥ s(G), for all groups G ∈ G
In this definition, an imputation specifies a payoff for each type of players. In particular,
the same type of player has the same payoff, as otherwise the player with a lower payoff
has an incentive to form a group with the group partners of the player with a higher
payoff such that all members in the new group have higher payoffs. The feasibility
condition ensures that players have small enough payoffs such that they can achieve
these payoffs by sharing group surpluses. The no-blocking condition ensures that players
have high enough payoffs such that no group of players can jointly do better by forming
a new group.
13In this paper,
∑
i∈G f(i) =
∑
i∈I G(i)f(i). This definition is well-defined since G = 0 at all but finitely
many points in its domain. See Footnote 5 for a definition of summation over G.
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2.2 Results
In this section, we state our results. The proofs of these results will be given in Section
2.3.
The first main theorem in this paper is the existence of a stable assignment when
group sizes are finitely bounded.
Theorem 1. For any game ((I, µ), s,N ′, N) satisfying Assumption (A1), there is a
stable assignment and its associated imputation is continuous.
Following the long-term wisdom in works such as Koopmans and Beckmann [1957],
Shapley and Shubik [1971], Gretsky et al. [1992], we prove the existence theorem by
establishing a duality relation. In our setting, the duality relation is that the maximum
social welfare achieved by forming small groups is equal to the minimum social welfare
such that no blocking coalition exists. The formal statement of the duality relation is
given by the following theorem.
Theorem 2. For any game ((I, µ), s,N ′, N) satisfying Assumption (A1), we have
sup
τ∈T
N∑
n=N ′
∫
Gn
sndτn = inf
u∈U
∫
I
udµ (3)
where U = {u ∈ L1(I, µ) : ∑i∈G u(i) ≥ s(G),∀G ∈ G} and the inifimum can be achieved
by a continuous function.
In particular, this duality theorem suggests that, in a stable state, the payoff of a
type i player is equal to his marginal contribution to the maximum social welfare. See
Section 2.2.1 for more details.
Our key observation in the proof of these two theorems is that any assignment
can be identified by a symmetric transport plan in some replicated agent space. We
will discuss this identification trick in more detail in Section 2.3.1 and Section 2.3.2.
As a consequence of the observation, the social welfare maximization problem can be
reformulated as a symmetric transport problem.
Proposition 1. For any game ((I, µ), s,N ′, N) satisfying Assumption (A1), there is a
symmetric14 upper semi-continuous function S : IN ! → R such that
sup
τ∈T
N∑
n=N ′
∫
Gn
sndτn = sup
γˆ∈Γˆsym
∫
IN !
S
N
dγˆ (4)
where Γˆsym is the set of symmetric measures on I
N ! such that all marginals are µ. i.e.
Γˆsym = {γˆ ∈M+(IN !) : γˆ is symmetric, γˆ(A× I × ...× I) = µ(A),∀measurable A ⊂ I}
14S is symmetric if, for any permutation σ ∈ SN !, any (i1, ..., iN !) ∈ IN !, S(i1, ..., iN !) = S(iσ(1), ..., iσ(N !)).
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This proposition helps us in two ways. Conceptually, it helps us to prove the ex-
istence of a stable assignment. In particular, it helps us to prove the duality theorem
(Theorem 2), which further implies the existence of a stable assignment in the game
(Theorem 1). Computationally, by generating symmetries to the problem, it helps
us to reduce the number of unknowns for finding stable assignments significantly. In
particular, this proposition enables the possibility of applying a dimensional reduction
technique developed in Friesecke and Vogler [2018]. We will discuss this computational
improvement in more detail in a production problem context in Section 2.5.2.
In addition, the reformulation has the potential to answer the following questions:
1. the uniqueness of stable assignments
2. the uniqueness of imputations
3. whether players of the same type have the same group partners
These questions are related to the uniqueness and purification properties of multi-
marginal transport problems. To my knowledge, no existing work can be applied di-
rectly beyond the two marginal case. We refer to Pass [2011] and Pass [2015b] for some
related results.
2.2.1 Remarks
The duality relation in Theorem 2 suggests that the payoff of a type i player in any
stable assignment is equal to his marginal contribution to the maximum social welfare.
For instance, in the finite type case, the maximum social welfare, as a function of type
distribution, is defined by a function Π : R|I|+ → R, where
Π(µ) = sup
τ∈T
∑
G∈G
s(G)τ(G) (5)
Since there are a continuum of players of each type, the maximum social surplus
function Π is a concave function on R|I|+ .15 Therefore, the super-derivative of the max-
imum social surplus is well-defined.
On the other hand, the duality theorem, Theorem 2, suggests,
Π(µ) = inf
u∈U
∑
i∈I
u(i)µ(i) (6)
where U = {u ∈ R|I|+ :
∑
i∈G u(i) ≥ s(G),∀G ∈ G}. Therefore, the imputation u
associated with a stable assignment is equal to the super-derivative of the concave
15For any type distributions µ1 and µ2, we fix two arbitrary assignments τ1 and τ2 representing the
partitions of players with a type distribution µ1 and µ2 respectively. Any convex combination cτ1 + (1− c)τ2
is an assignment representing a partition of players with a type distribution cµ1 + (1− c)µ2.
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maximum social welfare function. Formally, by Danskin’s theorem (Proposition B.25
in Bertsekas [1999]),
∂Π(µ) =
{
u ∈ U :
∑
i∈I
u(i)µ(i) = Π(µ)
}
That is, the payoff of a type i player is equal to his marginal contrition to the maximum
social surplus, provided the maximum social surplus function is differentiable. More
generally, the imputations provide separating hyperplanes for the set of feasible social
surplus.
Figure 1: Maximum Social Welfare and The Imputation of a Stable Assignment
By Figure 1, it is clear that, given a stable assignment, the corresponding imputation
is unique if and only if the maximum social surplus is differentiable. Unfortunately, the
differentiability requires stronger assumptions on the surplus function. An example of
a game with a non-differentiable maximum social surplus function is given in Section
2.4.1. On the other hand, as the maximum social welfare function Π is concave, Π is
differentiable almost everywhere. That is, in the finite type case, for almost all initial
distributions of types, the payoff at the stable state is unique.
2.2.2 Extensions
As remarked in Footnote 4 and Footnote 8, our model and results in this section can
be extended to the case where the type set is not compact and the surplus function is
only upper semi-continuous. In this subsubsection, we discuss two types of extensions.
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Firstly, when I is a (possibly non-compact) Polish space and the surplus function
is Lipchitz continuous, i.e. every sn is Lipchitz continuous, with all definitions in this
section remain the same, all results in this section hold, provided the surplus function
satisfies Assumption (A2c): for any permitted group size n, there is a function an ∈ C(I)
such that sn([i1, ..., in]) ≤
∑n
k=1 an(ik) for all i1, ..., in ∈ I. In particular, Assumption
(A2c) is automatically satisfied when sn is bounded or I is compact.
More generally, if I is a (possibly non-compact) Polish space and the surplus function
is upper semi-continuous, i.e. every sn is upper semi-continuous, we need to impose the
following boundedness assumption on the surplus function:
(A2) for any permitted group size n, there is a function an ∈ LSC(I) such that
sn([i1, ..., in]) ≤
∑n
k=1 an(ik) for all i1, ..., in ∈ I.
Again, Assumption (A2) is automatically satisfied when sn is bounded or I is compact.
With Assumption (A2) and the following changes on the definition of “formed groups”,
all results in this section hold:
1. in the definition of stable assignment, replace the term “for all formed groups G ∈
supp(τ)” in the feasibility condition by the term “for τ -almost all G ∈ supp(τ)”16
2. Theorem 1 holds if “and its associated imputation is continuous” is removed.
3. Theorem 2 holds if “by a continuous function” is removed.
4. Proposition 1 holds without any change.
2.3 Proof
Firstly, we prove Proposition 1 which states the social welfare maximization problem
can be reformulated as a symmetric transport problem. Then, we apply the duality
theorem for multi-transport problem in Kellerer [1984] to prove the duality theorem
Theorem 2. Lastly, we show the optimizers of the duality theorem can be attained and
are equivalent to a stable assignment and its corresponding imputation.
To start with, we reformulate the social welfare maximization problem as a sym-
metric transport problem in two steps.
In the first step, we transform a problem with multiple permitted group sizes up to
N to a problem with a unique permitted group size N !. We use the number N ! as it
16Equivalently, we can redefine a notion for formed groups in order to keep the term “for all formed groups”
in the sentence. The definition is as follows: a measurable set F ⊂ supp(τ) is a set of formed groups if F
has a full τ -measure. Formally, it means τn(F ∩ Gn) = τn(Gn) for all permitted group size n. Then, in
the definition of stable assignment, we just need to replace “for all formed groups G ∈ supp(τ)” by “for all
formed groups G ∈ F where F is a set of formed groups”. This subtlety about measure zero set comes from
the measure theoretic language we choose to use.
11
is a common multiple of all group sizes. The same argument works if we replace N ! by
any common multiple of group sizes17.
In the second step, we extend the domain of assignment from an unordered list of
types to an ordered list of types. On the technical level, we get rid of equivalent classes
by defining a pull-back measure carefully.
The proof is proceeded as follows. Firstly, we introduce these two steps formally in
Section 2.3.1 and Section 2.3.2. Next, we reformulate the social welfare maximization
problem as a symmetric transport problem in Section 2.3.3. Lastly, we prove the
existence of a stable assignment in Section 2.3.4.
2.3.1 Unifying Group Sizes
To unify the group sizes, we use fractional groups to identify groups of different sizes.
Formally, a fractional group is an element Gˆ = [i1, ..., iN !] ∈ IN !/ ∼N !. Intuitively,
a fractional group Gˆ = [i1, ..., iN !] represents a set of players of total mass N consisting
of 1(N−1)! unit mass of type in players for all permitted group size n.
For any permitted group size n, an n-person group can be identified by some frac-
tional group via replication. Therefore, the set of n-person groups corresponds to a
collection of fractional groups. Formally, for any permitted group size N ′ ≤ n ≤ N , we
define a subset Kn ⊂ IN !/ ∼N !, where
Kn =
{
[i1, ..., iN !] ∈ IN !/ ∼N !: |k ∈ N : ik = i| is divisible by N !
n
, ∀i ∈ I
}
(7)
Intuitively, every fractional group in Kn corresponds to an N !/n-fold replication of
some n-person group. We define an identification map Pn : Kn → In/ ∼n by
Pn([ i1, ..., i1︸ ︷︷ ︸
N !/n many
, ..., in, ..., in︸ ︷︷ ︸
N !/n many
]) = [i1, ..., in]
It is easy to verify that the identification map Pn is bijective. Therefore, Gn ' Kn and
Gn = Pn(Kn).
In addition, we extend the domain of surplus function: for any N ′ ≤ n ≤ N , we
define a function sˆn : I
N !/ ∼N !→ R by
sˆn(Gˆ) =
sn(Pn(Gˆ)), Gˆ ∈ Kn0, Gˆ /∈ Kn
Next, we define a surplus function on the set of fractional groups. We note that
the collection of subsets {Kn}N ′≤n≤N is not a partition of the set of fractional groups
17This replacement will help the computation significantly. However, it makes the notations messier. So
we stick with the choice N ! in this paper.
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IN !/ ∼N !. Therefore, we cannot combine the functions sˆn to define this surplus function
directly. However, we note that a welfare maximizing assignment assigns positive masses
to two groups, which correspond to the same fractional group, if and only if the average
surplus of these two groups are the same18. Therefore, we define the surplus function
sˆ : IN !/ ∼N !→ R by
sˆ = max
(
N
n
sˆn : n ∈ {N ′, ..., N}
)
19 (8)
The surplus function sˆ on fractional groups induces a partition {Rn}n=0,N ′,...,N of the
space IN !/ ∼N ! such that
• R0 ∩Kn = ∅, ∀n ∈ {N ′, ..., N}
• Rn ⊂ Kn and sˆn ≥ nm sˆm on Rn,∀N ′ ≤ n,m ≤ N
Such partition {Rn}n=0,N ′,...,N can be constructed iteratively:
• define R0 = IN !/ ∼N ! −
⋃N
n=N ′ Kn, and Rn = ∅ for all n ∈ {N ′, ..., N}
• set n = N ′
• update Rn to be {Gˆ ∈ Kn − ∪Nk=nRk : sˆ(Gˆ) = Nn sˆn(Gˆ)} for all n ∈ {N ′, ..., N}
• if n < N , set n to be n+ 1 and repeat the previous step, otherwise stops
Moreover, the surplus function sˆ on fractional groups inherits the properties of the
surplus function s:
Lemma 1. If the surplus function s satisfies Assumption (A1) and Assumption (A2),
then sˆ is upper semi-continuous and there is a lower semi-continuous function aˆ ∈
L1(I, µ) such that
sˆ([i1, ..., iN !]) ≤
N !∑
k=1
aˆ(ik)
Proof. See Appendix B.4. 
2.3.2 A Change of Variable Trick
Next, we extend the domain of a measure. In particular, a non-negative measure τ on
In/ ∼n will be identified by a symmetric measure γ on In. Here, n is a natural number
larger than or equal to 2.
Formally, given any non-negative measure τn on I
n/ ∼n, we define a non-negative
measure γn on I
n by
γn = cnQ
#
n τn (9)
18Otherwise, only the group with a higher average surplus will be formed in any welfare maximized assign-
ment.
19In the numerator, it is N rather than N ! as total mass of players in a fractional group is normalized to
be N .
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where cn : I
n → R is a measurable function20 defined by the combinatorial numbers
cn(i1, ..., in) =
1
(n− 1)!
∏
i∈I
ni!
21 (10)
where ni = |{k ∈ N : ik = i}| is the number of type i players in group [i1, ..., in] ∈ Gn,
and Qn : I
n → In/ ∼n is the quotient map such that
Qn(i1, ..., in) = [i1, ..., in]
In order to define the pullback measure Q#n τn on I
n, we partition In into small
components such that Qn is an injective map on each component.
Lemma 2. There is a partition {Jα}α∈A of In such that
• the index set A is a finite set
• each component Jα is Borel measurable in In
• the quotient map Qn is injective on Jα
Proof. We partition In in two steps.
Firstly, we partition In into |M| components, where the index set M is defined by
M =
n⋃
k=1
{m = (m1, ...,mk) ∈ Nk : m1 ≥ ... ≥ mk ≥ 1,m1 + ...+mk = n}
A component Jm with a index m = (m1, ...,mk) ∈M consists of all elements in the set
{(i1, ..., i1︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1 many
, i2, ..., i2︸ ︷︷ ︸
m2 many
, ..., ik, ..., ik︸ ︷︷ ︸
mk many
) ∈ In : i1, ..., ik are disjoint}
and all their permutations. We know Jm is a measurable set
22.
Secondly, for each indexm ∈M, we partition Jm into n!m1!...mk! components such that
Qn is injective on each component. The construction is as follows: for each permutation
σ ∈ Sn, we define
Jm,σ = {(jσ(1), ..., jσ(n)) ∈ In : j = (i1, ..., i1︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1 many
, i2, ..., i2︸ ︷︷ ︸
m2 many
, ..., ik, ..., ik︸ ︷︷ ︸
mk many
) ∈ In, i1, ..., ik are disjoint}
Jm,σ is a measurable set
23. Moreover, for any permutations σ1, σ2 ∈ Sn, we have either
Jm,σ1 = Jm,σ2 or Jm,σ1 ∩ Jm,σ2 = ∅. Moreover, ∪σ∈SnJm,σ = Jm. By deleting the
20See Appendix B.3 for the proof of measurability.
21There are finitely many i ∈ I such that ni 6= 0. The product over an infinite set
∏
i∈I ni! is defined to
be
∏
i∈I:ni 6=0 ni!
22See Appendix B.3 for a proof.
23See Appendix B.3 for a proof.
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repeated components from {Jm,σ}σ∈Sn , we have a partition of the set Jm such that Qn
is injective on each component.
In sum, by putting the indices (m,σ) together as a single index set A, we have the
partition. 
With the partition (Jα)α∈A of In, we define the pullback measure Q
#
n τn on I
n by
Q#n τn(S) =
∑
α∈A
τn(Qn(S ∩ Jα)), ∀measurable S ⊂ In (11)
We verify our definition of pullback measure by proving that τn is the push-forward
measure of γn under the map Qn/n:
Lemma 3. If γn is defined by τn according to Equation 9 and Equation 11, we have
nτn = (Qn)#γn (12)
Proof. See Appendix B.5. 
In the finite type case, Lemma 3 implies, for any list of types (i1, ..., in) ∈ In,
nτn([i1, ..., in]) = γn(Q
−1
n ([i1, ..., in])) =
∑
i1,...,in∈I
γn(i1, ..., in)
That is, for all groups G = [i1, ..., in], the sum of the γ values over all permutations of
the group G is equal to the total mass of players assigned to group G. Since γn is a
symmetric function, we have
γn(i1, ..., in) = cn(i1, ..., in)τn([i1, ..., in])
which gives us Equation 9. In particular, γn(i1, ..., in) is the product of some positive
constant and the mass of the n-person group [i1, ..., in] in assignment τ ∈ T. Recall
that a group G = [i1, ..., in] is formed when τ([i1, ..., in]) > 0. Therefore, an n-person
group G ∈ Gn is formed if and only if γn(Q−1n (G)) > 0 for some permitted group size
n. That is, a preimage Q−1n (G) is in the support of γn for some permitted group size
n. Consequently, the positive constant c plays no role in our definition of stability.
Other properties of γn is given as follows:
Lemma 4. For any measure γn defined by some measure τn and Equation 12, we have
1. γn is symmetric: for any measurable sets A1, ..., An ⊂ I,
γn(A1, ..., An) = γn(Aσ(1), ..., Aσ(n)),∀σ ∈ Sn
2. γn(A, I, I..., I) =
∑n
k=0 kτn(Gn(A, k)) for all measurable A ⊂ I
Proof. See Appendix B.6. 
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An immediate consequence of Lemma 4 is that, when there is a unique group size,
i.e. N ′ = N , γN , defined by an assignment τN ∈ T, is a symmetric measure such
that all its marginals are µ. That is, γN is a symmetric transport plan in the N -fold
replicated player space.
Lastly, we illustrate the change of variable trick in a game with three types of agents.
That is, I = {i1, i2, i3}. In this game, the unique permitted group size is 2.
Recall that an assignment τ ∈ T is a function defined on G = G2 = I2/ ∼2 satisfying
the consistency condition ∑
m6=n
τnm + 2τnn = 1, ∀n ∈ {1, 2, 3}
where τnm = τ([in, im]) for any n ≤ m. In particular, τnm is the mass of groups
consisting of one type in player and one type im player in assignment τ . Therefore, an
assignment τ can be represented by the upper triangular entries of a 3 by 3 matrix
τ =

τ11 τ12 τ13
τ22 τ23
τ33

Naturally, we wish to extend the domain of τ to the full domain I2 such that an
assignment can be presented by a matrix. There are infinitely many ways to extend the
domain. Among them, one of the most natural ways is to extend the upper triangular
entries symmetrically:
Q#3 τ =

τ11 τ12 τ13
τ21 τ22 τ23
τ31 τ32 τ33

While Q#3 τ is a symmetric matrix, it is not a transport plan as it does not satisfy
the marginal condition. In this case, it means the matrix is not bi-stochastic. To obtain
a bi-stochastic matrix, we multiply the diagonal entries by 2:
γ = cQ#3 τ =

2τ11 τ12 τ13
τ21 2τ22 τ23
τ31 τ32 2τ33

By the consistency condition of the assignment τ , γ is bi-stochastic. Therefore, we
obtain a symmetric transport plan γ in a two-folds replication of agent space.
A symmetric transport plan γ is represented in Figure 2. For any s, t ∈ {1, 2, 3},
the mass transported from a source is on the left to a destination it on the right is γst.
By the symmetry of the transport plan γ, the mass transported from a source is on the
left to a destination it on the right is equal to the mass transported from a source it on
the left to a destination is on the right.
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Figure 2: The symmetric transport plan γ in a two-folds replicated agent space
2.3.3 Symmetric Transport Problem
Next, we prove Proposition 1 by using the two tricks introduced in the previous two
subsubsections.
Firstly, we extend the domain of surplus function on fractional groups to the whole
domain by defining S : IN ! → R where
S(i1, ..., iN !) = sˆ([i1, ..., iN !]) (13)
where sˆ is defined in Equation 8. By Lemma 1, when the surplus function satisfies
assumption Assumption (A1) and Assumption (A2), S is upper semi-continuous in IN !
and there is a lower semi continuous aˆ ∈ L1(I, µ) such that
S(i1, ..., iN !) ≤
N !∑
k=1
aˆ(ik),∀i1, ..., iN ! ∈ I (14)
Now, we prove Proposition 1 by proving Equation 4 holds. i.e.
sup
τ∈T
N∑
n=N ′
∫
Gn
sndτn = sup
γˆ∈Γˆsym
∫
IN !
S
N
dγˆ
Firstly, we show the left hand side is not larger than the right hand side in Equation
4: for any fixed τ ∈ T, we construct γˆ ∈ Γˆsym such that
N∑
n=N ′
∫
Gn
sndτn ≤
∫
IN !
S
N
dγˆ
Given an assignment τ ∈ T, we define a measure τˆn on IN !/ ∼N ! such that for any
S ⊂ IN !/ ∼N !,
τˆn(S) = τn(Pn(S ∩Kn))
where Kn is defined in Equation 7. Applying the change of variable trick in Section
2.3.2, we have a measure γˆn on I
N ! where
γˆn = c ·Q#N !τˆn
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where c : IN ! → R is a measurable function defined by the combinatorial numbers
c(i1, ..., iN !) =
1
(N !− 1)!
∏
i∈I
ni!
where ni = |{k ∈ N : ik = i}|. By Lemma 4,
γˆn(A× I × ...× I) =
N !∑
k=0
kτˆn(GN !(A, k))
=
n∑
k=0
N !k
n
τˆn(GN !(A, N !k
n
))
=
N !
n
n∑
k=0
kτn(Gn(A, k))
Therefore, we define
γˆ =
1
N !
N∑
n=N ′
nγˆn
By Lemma 4, γˆ is symmetric. By Equation 2, γˆn(A× I × ...× I) = µ(A) for any Borel
measurable A ⊂ I. Consequently, γˆ ∈ Γˆsym.
Moreover, by Equation 8,
N∑
n=N ′
∫
Gn
sndτn =
N∑
n=N ′
∫
IN !/∼N !
sˆndτˆn ≤
N∑
n=N ′
n
∫
IN !/∼N !
sˆ
N
dτˆn
Applying Lemma 3, we have∫
IN !/∼N !
sˆ
N
dτˆn =
1
N !
∫
IN !
S
N
dγˆn
Therefore,
N∑
n=N ′
∫
Gn
sndτn ≤
N∑
n=N ′
n
N !
∫
IN !
S
N
dγˆn =
∫
IN !
S
N
dγˆ
Conversely, we show the left hand side is not less than the right hand side in Equation
4: for any maximizer γˆ ∈ Γˆsym of the right hand side of Equation 424, we construct a
τ ∈ T such that
N∑
n=N ′
∫
Gn
sndτn =
∫
IN !
S
N
dγˆ (15)
Firstly, since γˆ is a maximizer, the support of γˆ cannot intersect the set Q−1N ! (R0).
Otherwise, a normalized version of γˆ|Q−1N ! (R0)c will give a higher value for the maximiza-
tion problem.
24The existence of a maximizer is proved in the next subsubsection.
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For every permitted group size n ∈ {N ′, ..., N}, we define a measure γˆn on IN ! by
γˆn(S) =
N !
n
γˆ(S ∩Q−1N ! (Rn)), ∀measurable S ⊂ IN !
In particular, the support of γn lies in the set Q
−1
N ! (Rn). By the definition of Γˆsym and
the fact that the support of γˆ is in ∪Nn=N ′Q−1N ! (Rn), we have
µ(A) = γˆ(A× I × ...× I)
= γˆ(A× I × ...× I ∩ (∪Nn=N ′Q−1N ! (Rn)))
=
N∑
n=N ′
γˆ(A× I × ...× I ∩Q−1N ! (Rn))
=
N∑
n=N ′
n
N !
γˆn(A× I × ...× I) (16)
Next, for every permitted group size n, we define a measure τˆn on the set of fractional
groups IN !/ ∼N ! by
τˆn = (QN !)#γˆn
Applying Lemma 4 to Equation 16, we have
µ(A) =
N∑
n=N ′
n
N !
γˆn(A× I × ...× I) =
N∑
n=N ′
N !∑
k=0
k
n
N !
τˆn(GN !(A, k))
Recall the identification map Pn : Kn ⊂ IN !/ ∼N !→ Gn, we define a measure τn on
the set of n-person groups Gn ' In/ ∼n by
τn(S) = τˆn(P
−1
n (S)),∀ measurable S ⊂ Gn
Therefore,
N !∑
k=0
kτˆn(GN !(A, k)) =
n∑
k=0
N !
n
kτˆn(GN !(A, N !
n
k)) =
n∑
k=0
N !
n
kτn(Gn(A, k))
Consequently, we have
µ(A) =
N∑
n=N ′
n∑
k=0
kτn(Gn(A, k))
i.e. τ = (τN ′ , ..., τN ) ∈ T is an assignment.
Lastly, we check that Equation 15 holds:
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∫
IN !
S
N
dγˆ =
N∑
n=N ′
∫
Q−1N ! (Rn)
S
N
dγˆ
=
N∑
n=N ′
∫
Q−1N ! (Rn)
S
N
n
N !
dγˆn
=
N∑
n=N ′
∫
Rn
n
N
sˆdτˆn
=
N∑
n=N ′
∫
Rn
sˆndτˆn
=
N∑
n=N ′
∫
Gn
sndτn
Hence, we proved Equation 4 holds.
2.3.4 Existence
Lastly, we prove the existence of a stable assignment. We will first prove the duality
relation stated in Theorem 2 holds and the optimizers can be achieved. Then, we
establish the relationship between the duality relation and the stable assignment.
The proof of the duality relation is proceeded in three steps:
1. reformulate the social welfare maximization problem as a symmetric transport
problem, as stated in Proposition 1
2. apply the duality result in multi-marginal transport problem in Kellerer [1984]
3. prove the dual problem of the symmetric tranport problem is the same as a social
welfare minimization problem such that no blocking coalition exists
To prove Theorem 2, we state two lemmas. Lemma 5 states that the theorem holds
when there is a unique group size. Lemma 6 implies the dual problem of the transport
problem is the same as the social welfare minimization problem such that no blocking
coalition exists. We need the following definitions to state these two lemmas:
1. Γˆ is the set of measures on IN ! such that all marginals are µ:
Γˆ =
{
γˆ ∈M+(IN !) : γˆ(A× I × ...× I) = ... = γˆ(I × ...× I ×A) = µ(A),∀A ⊂ I
}
2. Uˆ is the set of imputations such that there is no blocking fractional group.
Uˆ =
{
u ∈ L1(I, µ) :
N !∑
k=1
u(ik) ≥ (N − 1)!S(i1, ..., iN !), ∀i1, ..., iN ! ∈ I
}
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For comparison, we recall that
Un =
{
u ∈ L1(I, µ) :
n∑
k=1
u(ik) ≥ s([i1, ..., in]),∀i1, ..., in ∈ I
}
and
U =
{
u ∈ L1(I, µ) :
∑
i∈G
u(i) ≥ s(G), ∀G ∈ G
}
Lemma 5. For any symmetric upper semi-continuous function S on IN ! satisfying
Equation 14,
sup
γˆ∈Γˆsym
∫
IN !
S
N
dγˆ = inf
u∈Uˆ
∫
I
udµ
and the infimum can be achieved.
Proof. See Appendix B.7. 
Lemma 6.
Uˆ = U =
N⋂
n=N ′
Un
Proof. See Appendix B.8. 
Now, we are ready to prove the duality theorem, Theorem 2.
Proof of the duality theorem. By Proposition 1,
sup
τ∈T
N∑
n=N ′
∫
Gn
sndτn = sup
γˆ∈Γˆsym
∫
IN !
S
N
dγˆ
By Lemma 5,
sup
γˆ∈Γˆsym
∫
IN !
S
N
dγˆ = inf
u∈Uˆ
∫
I
udµ
and the infimum on the right can be achieved. By Lemma 6,
inf
u∈Uˆ
∫
I
udµ = inf
u∈U
∫
I
udµ
Therefore, we have the duality relation:
sup
τ∈T
N∑
n=N ′
∫
Gn
sndτn = inf
u∈Uˆ
∫
I
udµ
See Appendix B.9 for a proof of the existence of a continuous minimizer. 
Next, we show the maximum social welfare can be achieved:
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Lemma 7. There is a maximizer solving the maximization problem
sup
τ∈T
N∑
n=N ′
∫
Gn
sndτn
Proof. See Appendix B.10. 
In sum, we have proved the duality relation in Theorem 2 and the fact that the
optima in the duality relation Equation 3 can be achieved. To show the existence of a
stable assignment, it remains to the show the equivalence relation between the stable
assignment and the duality relation.
Lemma 8. In the duality relation, Equation 3, any maximizer τ is a stable assignment
and a continuous minimizer u gives a corresponding imputation.
Conversely, any stable assignment τ solves the maximization problem in the duality
relation, Equation 3, and any imputation u associated with this stable assignment solves
the minimization problem in the duality relation, Equation 3.
Proof. See Appendix B.11. 
2.4 Examples
2.4.1 Non-Differentiablity of The Maximum Social Welfare Function
Firstly, we illustrate the maximum social welfare function may not be differentiable. In
the finite type case, the maximum social welfare function Π : R|I|+ → R is given by
Π(µ) = sup
τ∈T
∑
G∈G
s(G)τ(G)
We study a game with two types of players. e.g. I = {1, 2}. The mass of type
1, 2 agents are µ1 and µ2 respectively. In this game, the only permitted group size is
2. That is, N ′ = N = 2. In addition, all groups have zero surplus except the groups
consisting both types of players, which have one unit of surplus. i.e.
s([i, j]) =
0 if i = j1 if i 6= j
It is easy to see that the social surplus is higher if there are more groups consisting of
both types of players. Therefore, we have
Π(µ1, µ2) = min(µ1, µ2)
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Consequently, the maximum social surplus is not differentiable at (1, 1) since
lim
ε→0+
Π(1 + ε, 1) = 1 = Π(1, 1)
lim
ε→0+
Π(1− ε, 1) = 1− ε = Π(1, 1)− ε
That is, the directional derivative of Π at (1, 1) is 1 along the direction (1, 0), but is 0
along the direction (−1, 0).
However, the set of imputations coincide with the superderivatives of Π: any stable
assignment assigns min(µ1, µ2) unit mass of the groups consisting players of both types,
and assigns the remaining players pairwisely. Players’ payoffs at µ = (µ1, µ2) is given
by 
if µ1 = µ2, u1 + u2 = 1, u1 ≥ 0, u2 ≥ 0
if µ1 > µ2, u1 = 0, u2 = 1
if µ1 < µ2, u1 = 1, u2 = 0
2.4.2 Unifying Group sizes
Next, we illustrate the trick of reformulating a problem with multiple group sizes to a
problem with a unique group size.
We study a game with three types of players. e.g. I = {1, 2, 3}. There are a unit
mass of each type of players in the game. i.e. µ1 = µ2 = µ3 = 1. Permitted group sizes
are 2 and 3. i.e. N ′ = 2, N = 3. Group surpluses are given by
s([1, 2, 2]) = 9, s([3, 3, 3]) = 4
s([1, 2]) = 2, s([3, 3]) = 3
all other groups have surplus 0
To reformulate a problem with multiple group sizes as a problem with a unique group
size, we treat a 2-person group as 2/3 unit of some fractional group. For instance, the
2-person group [i, j] corresponds to 2/3 unit of the fractional group [i, i, i, j, j, j], which
consists of 1.5 units of type i players and 1.5 units of type j players.
Therefore, to find an optimal partition of the players into small groups of size 2
and 3, it is sufficient to find the optimal partition of the players into fractional groups.
Formally, we use a 6-tuple [i1, ..., i6] ∈ I6/ ∼6 to denote a fractional group. Intuitively,
a fractional group [i1, ..., i6] is a subset of players of total mass 3, which consists of
1/2 unit of type ik players for each 1 ≤ k ≤ 6. In this example, there are 13 types of
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fractional groups.
Gˆ = {[1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1], [2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2], [3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3],
[1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2], [1, 1, 1, 3, 3, 3], [2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3],
[1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2], [1, 1, 1, 1, 3, 3], [2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1],
[2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3], [3, 3, 3, 3, 1, 1], [3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2], [1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3]}
In particular, a fractional group might correspond to two groups. For instance, both
the 2-person group [1, 1] and the 3-person group [1, 1, 1] correspond to the fractional
group [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1]. However, when social welfare is maximized, both the 2-person
group [1, 1] and the 3-person group [1, 1, 1] are formed if and only if 1.5s[1, 1] = s[1, 1, 1].
When 1.5s[1, 1] > s[1, 1, 1], only the 2-person group [1, 1] will be formed as we can break
the group [1, 1, 1] into 1.5 units of the 2-person group [1, 1] and the total surplus will
increase. When 1.5s[1, 1] < s[1, 1, 1], similar operations can be implemented to increase
the social welfare. Therefore, we define the surplus of a fractional group to be the
maximum total surplus this fractional group of players can obtain by forming 2- or
3-person groups. Numerically, the surplus function is given by:
sˆ(Gˆ) =

1.5× 2 = 3, if Gˆ = [1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2]
9, if Gˆ = [1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2]
max(4, 1.5× 3) = 4.5, if Gˆ = [3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3]
0, otherwise
It is worth noting that we define the surplus of the fractional group Gˆ = [1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2]
to be the welfare of the group, consisting of 1.5 units of type 1 players and 1.5 units
of type 2 players, when all players are assigned into 2-person groups, as no 3-person
group corresponds to the fractional group Gˆ = [1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2]. However, the maximum
welfare of this group of players is at least 2/3 × 9 = 6 since it contains 2/3 mass of
3-person group [2, 3, 3]. Consequently, Gˆ will not be formed (appear with positive mass
in the partition) in any optimal partition of players into fractional groups. Besides, the
average surplus of the 2-person group [3, 3], which is 3/2, is larger than the average
surplus of the 3-person group [3, 3, 3], which is 1. Therefore, all type 3 players will be
assigned in pairs in any stable assignment.
Given the surplus of fractional groups, the welfare maximization problem is refor-
mulated as
sup
τˆ
∑
Gˆ∈Gˆ
sˆ(Gˆ)τˆ(Gˆ)
Here, τˆ : Gˆ → R+ is the non-negative valued function on the set of fractional groups
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satisfying the following consistency condition: for any disjoint i, j, k ∈ {1, 2, 3},
3τ([i, i, i, i, i, i]) + 2[τ([i, i, i, i, j, j]) + τ([i, i, i, i, k, k])]
+1.5[τ([i, i, i, j, j, j]) + τ([i, i, i, k, k, k])]
+[τ([i, i, j, j, j, j]) + τ([i, i, k, k, k, k]) + τ([i, i, k, k, j, j])] = 1
That is, we reformulate the problem in which groups sizes are 2 or 3 to a problem
in which the unique group size is 3! = 6.
2.4.3 Unbounded Group Sizes
When group sizes are unbounded, the existence of a stable assignment has been studied
in an approximate manner25 in Hammond et al. [1989]. In this subsection, we illustrate
that an stable assignments may not exist when group sizes are unbounded.
Consider a game with a continuum of homogeneous players. The surplus of any
n-person group is given by sn = n − 1. By the equal treatment property of stable
assignment, the payoff of any player, in any stable assignment, cannot be higher than or
equal to 1. If there is a stable assignment in which all agents have a payoff u < 1−1/m.
Then, m players will form a blocking coalition.
In this example, the surplus function is not uniformly bounded: we have sn → +∞
as n → +∞. When the surplus function is uniformly bounded, the uniform bound
will impose a natural upper bound on the group sizes: for formed groups containing
too many players, the average payoff of players will goes to zero. Therefore, there is a
subset of players in this formed group who have incentive to form a blocking coalition.
2.4.4 An Exchange Economy with Groupwise Externalities
In exchange economies, when there is no consumption externalities, the surplus function
is always super-additive. Here, the surplus of a group is defined by the maximum total
welfare of the group members who exchange commodities within the group. In contrast,
when there are consumption externalities, the surplus function may no longer be super-
additive. We give one such example with groupwise envy. This type of groupwise
externality differs from the widespread externalities introduced in Hammond et al.
[1989].
Now, we describe an economy with groupwise envy. In the economy, agents, with
quasi-linear utility functions, either do not trade or trade in pairs. There are one
consumption good and two types of agents, type 1 and type 2. Utility functions and
initial endowments are given by
u1(m,x,G) = m1 +
√
x1 + (x1 −max
j∈G
xj), ω1 = (0, 0)
25with the approximate feasibility condition.
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u2(m,x,G) = m2 + 100
√
x2 + (x2 −max
j∈G
xj), ω2 = (0, 100)
Here, utility functions are real-valued maps on the monetary good consumption,
consumption good consumption and the group the agent is in. The externality term
xi−maxj∈G xj suggests that an agent would envy his trade partner if his trade partner
consumes more consumption goods than him.
By the definition of the surplus function,
s([1]) = 0, s([2]) = 1000
s([1, 1]) = 0, s([2, 2]) = 2000
s([1, 2]) = max
x1,x2≥0:x1+x2=100
√
x1 + 100
√
x2 + 100− 2 max(x1, x2) ' 900.083
where the maximizers are x1 ' 0.03, x2 ' 99.97.
That is, the joining of a type 1 agent to the 1-person group consisting of just a type 2
agent will reduce the group surplus due to the existence of groupwise envy. Intuitively,
since type 2 agents value the consumption good much more than type 1 agents, in
any efficient outcome, almost all consumption good will be consumed by type 2 agents.
Consequently, although the type 1 agent consumes a little consumption good by trading
with the type 2 agent, his envy makes him much less happy. In addition, the type 2
agent, consuming a little less consumption good, is also less happy. Therefore, with
groupwise envy, the sum of payoffs are decreased after the trade.
2.5 Applications
In this part, we apply our results to three problems.
2.5.1 Surplus Sharing Problem
In a market, a continuum of agents of different types form groups in order to share
group surpluses. Each agent can participate to form only one group and each group
can be formed by at most N agents. The surplus of a formed group only depends on
the type distribution of its members.
By our results, there is a stable state in this market. At the stable state, agents
are endogenously segmented into small groups and they have a way to share the group
surplus such that no subset of agents have incentives to form a new group.
We have three more observations regarding the stable state of the market. Firstly, at
the stable state, the same type of agents have the same payoff, which can be understood
as the wage level of this type of players. Secondly, at the stable state, the surplus of
any formed group is equal to the total payoff of its members. Thirdly, at a stable state,
even if an agent can initiate to form a new group and obtain all the group surplus of
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the new group by paying some other agents an amount no less than their wage levels,
no agent has incentive to do so. The reason of this fact is that, at an stable state, the
group surplus an agent could obtain by forming a new group minus all the wages he
pays to the others cannot be larger than his current wage level.
2.5.2 Production Problem
Given a bag of (finitely many or infinitely many) inputs (Lego bricks), there are nu-
merous ways to combine them into outputs (toys), each of which has a value. The
production of any output requires a specific finite combination of inputs (Lego bricks).
Production technology specifies a relation between input distributions and output val-
ues. Knowing the production technology, there are two natural questions. Firstly, what
is the bag’s value, defined as the maximum total value of outputs obtained by using
the inputs in the bag? Secondly, how to achieve this maximum value?
Figure 3: Production problem26
By our results, each type of inputs is endowed with a value defined by the imputation
corresponding to a stable assignment. Conceptually, knowing these values, we can
answer the first question on the bag’s value in the following sense: when the bag
contains a continuum of inputs, the sum (integration) of input values in the bag will
give the bag’s value. When the bag contains only finitely many inputs, the sum of
input values in the bag will give an upper bound on the bag’s value. When we have
26an online picture.
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a large number of bags containing the same inputs, the total value of these bags is
approximately equal to the total value of all inputs.
Actually, it is easy to see that these two questions can be answered by directly
solving a profit maximization problem stated in Equation 5, in which the choice set is
the set of all partitions of inputs into small groups. Each small group in the partition
will be used to produce an output. When there are a continuum of inputs in the bag,
the maximization problem in Equation 5 gives exact answers to both questions. When
there are only finitely many inputs, the maximization problem in Equation 5 gives
approximate answers to both questions.
However, it is usually computationally infeasible to solve the linear programming
problem Equation 5, as the number of unknowns |G| becomes astronomical even when
the maximum group size is very small.27 For example, when there are |I| = 1000 types
of inputs and each toy requires a combination of at most 4 pieces of bricks, there are
|G| =
4∑
n=1
((
1000
n
))
' 4.2× 1010
types of toys. That is, in order to answer either question, the direct method is to solve
a maximization problem with 4.2× 1010 unknowns.
To deal with the curse of dimensionality, a first thought is that we could apply the
duality relation in Theorem 2 to answer the first question: to compute the bag’s value,
or a upper approximation of the bag’s value, we only need to compute the values of
inputs. That is, we only need to solve the dual problem in Equation 6 with only |I|
unknowns. However, this dual problem is also hard to solve as there are |G| constraints
in it. Moreover, the minimization problem provides no answer to our second question
about the optimal way of production.
It appears a better way to deal with the curse of dimensionality is to use Proposi-
tion 1 to reformulate the maximization problem as an N !-marginal symmetric trans-
port problem. Utilizing the symmetric structure in the symmetric transport problem,
Friesecke and Vogler [2018] proved this N !-marginal symmetric transport problem can
be further reformulated as a combinatorial maximization problem with only (N !+1)|I|
27|G| = ∑Nn=N ′ (( |I|n )) = Θ(|I|N ).
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unknowns.28 In the example with 1000 types of inputs and group sizes are up to 4, the
reformulated maximization problem has 25000 unknowns. We refer to Khoo and Ying
[2019] for a numerical implementation of this dimension reduction trick.
2.5.3 Market Segmentation
Lastly, we consider an exchange economy with no centralized market. In such economy,
a continuum of agents exchange commodities with each other within small groups of
bounded finite sizes. Each type of agent is represented by a continuous quasi-linear
utility function and an initial endowment. In this economy, we allow the existence of
groupwise externalities: agents’ utility functions may depend on the consumption of
their trade partners. An example of an economy with groupwise externalities is given
in Section 2.4.4.
Our result suggests, with necessary assumptions on the continuity and boundedness
of utility functions and initial endowments, there is a stable state in which the market
is segmented into small groups and no subset of agents can jointly do better by forming
a new group to trade with each other.
2.6 Related Literature
We review the literature from two perspectives: the conceptual perspective and the
methodological perspective.
From the conceptual perspective, the most relevant literature to the material in this
section is the f-core literature in Kaneko and Wooders [1982], Kaneko and Wooders
[1986], Hammond et al. [1989], Kaneko and Wooders [1996]. With an approximate
feasibility condition, this sequence of works proves the existence of an approximately
stable assignment in games with a compact type space.29
28The number of unknown can be further reduced if not all group sizes are permitted. In particular,
we can always replace the number N ! by the least common multiple of all group sizes. When N is fixed
and |I| is large, (N ! + 1)|I| = Θ(|I|). Moreover, we note this reduction technique is not a free lunch. In
particular, it transforms a linear programming problem to a combinatorial optimization problem. However,
when |I| is large, solving the linear programming problem is impossible due to the large number of unknowns.
This reduction trick provides a possibility to solve the optimization problem even though the transformed
problem is combinatorial. For instance, Khoo and Ying [2019] used the trick to solve a problem which has
1025 unknowns initially.
29This sequence of works are mainly focused on models with non-transferable utility. Here, I am talking
about the application of these works to a game with transferable utility. It is worth noting that the method
we developed in this paper depending on linear dualities, and thus cannot be applied to nontransferable
utility games directly. For a link between duality and games with nontransferable utility, we refer to No¨ldeke
and Samuelson [2018].
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There are three major differences between the literature mentioned above and the
work in this section. Firstly, in this section, we developed a new formulation for the con-
cept f-core by studying a statistical representation of the partition. Secondly, dropping
the approximate feasibility assumption, we proved the existence of an stable assignment
in a game with possibly a non-compact type space. Thirdly, we showed that, when the
surplus function is continuous, similar agents obtain similar payoffs in a stable state.
The framework and results in this section unified the literature on matching problem,
roommate problem and f-core. When the unique permitted group size is 2 and the
surplus function has a bipartite structure, our work implies results on the matching
problem. In particular, Shapley and Shubik [1971] and Roth et al. [1993] studied
matching problem with a finite type space. Gretsky et al. [1992], Chiappori et al.
[2010] and Chiappori et al. [2016] studied matching problem with a general type space.
When the permitted group size is k and the surplus function is assumed to have a
k-partite structure, our work implies results on the multi-matching problem such as
Carlier and Ekeland [2010] and Pass [2015b]. When there is an upper bound on group
sizes, our work implies results on f-core in the transferable cases. In particular, Kaneko
and Wooders [1982], Kaneko and Wooders [1986], Wooders [2012] studied f-core with a
finite type space. Kaneko and Wooders [1996] studied f-core with a compact atomless
type space.
Our model assumes that there are a continuum of players in the game. It is valid
to ask, with a discrete player set, whether a stable assignment exists or not. To my
knowledge, our understanding is complete only when the unique permitted group size
is 2: when the surplus function has a bipartite structure, Koopmans and Beckmann
[1957] proves the existence of a stable assignment. When the surplus function has no
bipartite structure, Chiappori et al. [2014] proves the existence of a stable assignment if
the player set is replicated 2 times. Both observations rely on the validity of Birkhoff-
von Neumann theorem on matrices. Finding a high dimensional analog of Birkhoff
von-Neumann theorem is an ongoing project30. Therefore, we need to develop new
tools to understand discrete models when the maximum group size is larger than 2.
From the methodological perspective, the literature on f-core such as Kaneko and
Wooders [1982], Kaneko and Wooders [1986], Kaneko and Wooders [1996] did not use
the optimization method to prove the existence of a stable assignment, as the problem is
formulated in a non-transferable utility environment. However, in a transferable utility
environment, it is most natural to use linear programming to analyze the problem.
Indeed, when there are only finitely many types of players in the game, it is well
known that linear programming helps to prove the existence of a stable assignment.
We refer to Wooders [2012] for details. The idea of using linear programming to prove
30See Linial and Luria [2014] for related literature.
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stability dates back to the ground-breaking works of Bondareva [1963] and Shapley
[1967], in which the connection between core and linear programming is established.
Several works including Kannai [1969], Schmeidler [1972b], Kannai [1992] extended this
connection to infinite type spaces. However, these extensions are not applicable to our
model in which group sizes are bounded.
In this section, we connected the literature on f-core to transport problems. This
connection helps us to prove the existence of a stable assignment for general type space
and significantly reduces the number of unknowns for finding stable assignments in the
finite type case.
Actually, there is a long tradition of applying the transportation method to study
stability. In this line, most works assume some structure on the surplus function: when
the surplus function has a bipartite structure and the unique permitted group size is 2,
Koopmans and Beckmann [1957], Shapley and Shubik [1971] studied stable matching
with a finite type space. Gretsky et al. [1992], Chiappori et al. [2010], Chiappori et al.
[2016] studied stable matching with a general type space. When the surplus function
has a k-partite structure and the unique permitted group size is k, Carlier and Ekeland
[2010] and Pass [2015b] studied stable multi-matching with general type spaces. When
the surplus function has no special structure and the unique permitted group size is 2,
Chiappori et al. [2014] studied stable matching in a discrete player model. Their key
observation is that any pure matching in the replicated player space corresponds to an
assignment. In this section, we propose an identification trick that is inversely related
to their observation: an assignment can be identified by some symmetric transport plan
in a replicated player space. This identification trick helps us in two ways. Firstly, it
helps us to study games with a continuum of players, with small groups containing
more than two players and with small groups of different sizes. Secondly, it helps to
establish the equivalence relation between the set of stable assignments and the solution
of a symmetric optimal transport problem.
Recently, Friesecke and Vogler [2018] introduced a dimension reduction trick to
significantly reduce the number of unknowns in a symmetric optimal transport problem.
This trick has a huge potential in computations. In particular, Khoo and Ying [2019]
used this dimension reduction trick to solve a problem with 1025 unknowns. In this
section, by relating stable assignments to symmetric transport plans, we enable the
possibility of applying this dimension reduction trick to find stable assignments.
For more complete surveys on optimal transport problems, we refer to Villani [2008]
for 2-marginal problems, to Pass [2011] and Pass [2015a] for multi-marginal problems.
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3 Games with Positive-Size Groups
In Section 2, a small group is defined as a finite subset of players. Therefore, every
small group contains at most finitely many types of players and is of “measure zero”. In
some applications such as Schmeidler [1972a], small groups may contain infinitely many
types of players and have small masses. To study this phenomenon, in this section, we
extend our previous model and study small groups with small positive masses.
This section is organized as follows. In Section 3.1, we set up the problem. In
Section 3.2, we state the results. In Section 3.3, we review the literature. All proofs
are postponed to Appendix C.
3.1 Model
We study a cooperative (transferable utility) game represented by the tuple ((I, µ), s, ε′, ε).
Here, the positive numbers ε′, ε ∈ (0, 1] are the lower and upper bounds on group sizes
respectively.
3.1.1 Type Space
The type space of players is summarized by a probability space (I, µ). In the tuple, I
is a Polish space representing the set of players’ types and µ ∈ P(I) is a probability
measure on I representing the distribution of players’ types. In particular, µ is not
assumed to be atomless.
3.1.2 Groups
Groups are the units in which players interact with each other. Similar to the formula-
tion of sub-population in Che et al. [2019], a group is defined by a non-negative measure
ν ∈ M+(I) on I that is not larger than µ. The size of a group ν is its total measure
‖ν‖ = ν(I) on I. All group sizes are bounded from below by ε′ ∈ (0, 1]31 and bounded
from above by ε ∈ (0, 1], where ε ≥ ε′. When ε = ε′, only one group size is permitted
in the game.
Formally, a group is a non-negative measure ν on I such that ν ≤ µ and ‖ν‖ ∈ [ε′, ε].
The set of groups G consists of all groups which sizes are bounded by ε′ and ε:
G = {ν ∈M+(I) : ν ≤ µ, ε′ ≤ ν(I) ≤ ε}
31Technically, it is important to assume that the group sizes are bounded away from zero. The strictly
positive lower bound will imply that the set of assignments defined later is a compact set in weak topology.
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The set of groups G is endowed with the weak topology32.
3.1.3 Surplus Function
The surplus function specifies the total amount of surplus group members can share.
Formally, a surplus function s : G → R+ is a real valued function on the set of groups.
There are two assumptions on the surplus function:
(B1) s is upper semi-continuous in the weak topology.
(B2) there is a bounded continuous function a ∈ Cb(I) such that s(ν) ≤
∫
I adν, for all
ν ∈ G.
Assumption (B1) states the continuity requirement of the surplus function and As-
sumption (B2) ensures the integrability of the surplus function. We note Assumption
(B2) is satisfied if there is a constant c ≥ 0 such that s(ν) ≤ c ‖ν‖ for all ν ∈ G. That
is, Assumption (B2) is satisfied if the average contribution of a player to any group is
bounded from above by a constant c > 0.
We say a surplus function is linear, if for all ν ∈ G and α > 0, we have s(αν) = αs(ν)
whenever αν ∈ G. Moreover, we say a surplus function is super-additive, if for all
ν1, ν2 ∈ G, we have s(ν1 + ν2) ≥ s(ν1) + s(ν2) whenever ν1 + ν2 ∈ G. In particular,
a surplus function generated from a general equilibrium model with no externalities is
both linear and super-additive.
3.1.4 Assignments
An assignment is a partition of a continuum replication of players into groups of per-
mitted sizes. The continuum replication of players is consistent with our study of
small groups: a group of players containing 99% of the total population is small in the
continuum replicated player set.
Formally, an assignment is a non-negative measure on the set of groups G satisfying
the consistency condition:∫
G
ν(A)dγ(ν) = µ(A), ∀measurable A ⊂ I33
32By Theorem 8.3.2 in Bogachev [2007], the weak topology on M+(I) is metrizable by the Kantorovitch-
Rubinstein norm ‖·‖0 defined by
‖µ‖0 = sup
{∫
I
fdµ : f ∈ Lip1(I), ‖f‖∞ ≤ 1
}
33For any Borel measurable A ⊂ I, the real valued map ν → ν(A) on M+(I) is continuous in the weak
topology since
|ν1(A)− ν2(A)| ≤
∫
A
1d|ν1 − ν2| ≤
∫
I
1d|ν1 − ν2| ≤ ‖ν1 − ν2‖0
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The consistency condition states that all players, whose types are in A, are assigned
by the assignment γ. Moreover, we use a set ΓG to denote the set of assignments. i.e.
ΓG =
{
ν ∈M+(G) :
∫
G
ν(A)dγ(ν) = µ(A), ∀measurable A ⊂ I
}
Intuitively, γ(ν) gives the average mass of group ν in the partition of the replicated
player set: when the player set is replicated by a large number, the product of γ(ν)
and the number of replication specifies the number of groups ν in the partition of the
replicated player set determined by assignment γ.
We finish this subsubsection by two remarks.
Firstly, the set of assignments ΓG is non-empty since 2ε+ε′1 ε+ε′
2
µ
∈ ΓG . That is, all
players are assigned to the group ε+ε
′
2 µ ∈ G.
Secondly, an assignment is not a probability measure on G in general. We prove by
contradiction. If an assignment is a probability measure on G, then, by taking A = I in
the consistency condition, we have that the left hand side of the consistency equation
is less than ε while the right hand side of the consistency equation is 1. Contradiction.
3.1.5 Stability
Similar to the case where group sizes are finite, we say an assignment γ ∈ ΓG is stable
if there is an imputation u ∈ L1(I, µ) such that
1.
∫
I udν ≤ s(ν), for γ−almost all groups ν ∈ G34
2.
∫
I udν ≥ s(ν), for all groups ν ∈ G
The first condition is the feasibility condition, which states that, in any formed
group (intuitively, a group with a positive mass in the partition), group members can
in total share no more than the group surplus. The second condition is the no-blocking
condition, which states no group of agents could jointly do better by forming a new
group.
We note, when the surplus function is linear, a stable assignment can be interpreted
as a stable way to partition of the continuum players into small groups with no lower
bound on group sizes35.
Therefore, the map ν → ν(A) is Borel measurable. That is, ∫G ν(A)dγ(ν) is well-defined.
34Here, we need the term “almost everywhere” since we did not prove that there exists a continuous
imputation. See Footnote 16 for the related discussions on “formed groups”.
35When the surplus function is linear, the surplus of a group ν is equal to the total surplus of 1/α units of
groups αν. Consequently, in any stable assignment γ, for any formed group ν and α > 0,
∫
I
ud(αν) ≤ s(αν)
provided the scaled group αν ∈ G. Therefore, in a stable assignment, any group with a positive mass in the
partition can be split in an arbitrary uniform way without changing the stability property of the assignment.
34
3.2 Results
We prove the existence of a stable assignment by establishing a “continuum”-marginal
extension of the Koopmans-Kantorovitch duality theorem. Therefore, we have the
following two theorems.
Theorem 3. For any game ((I, µ), s, ε′, ε) satisfying Assumption (B1) and Assumption
(B2), there is a stable assignment.
Theorem 4. For any game ((I, µ), s, ε′, ε) satisfying Assumption (B1) and Assumption
(B2),
sup
γ∈ΓG
∫
G
sdγ = inf
u∈U
∫
I
udµ
where U = {u ∈ L1(µ) : ∫I udν ≥ s(ν), ∀ν ∈ G} and the infimum could be attained.
The proofs of these two theorems are postponed to Appendix C.
3.3 Related Literature
Small groups of positive sizes have been studied by Schmeidler [1972a] in exchange
economies. In his work, Schmeidler proved that any core allocation cannot be blocked
by any small group of epsilon sizes. However, since core allocations are not feasible in
general, this result is not enough to imply the existence of a stable assignment.
In this section, we developed a game model with small groups of positive sizes and
proved the existence of a stable assignment. In particular, we do not assume the surplus
function to be linear or super-additive. Therefore, our model can be used to analyze
exchange economies with externalities.
To prove the existence result, we generalized the Koopmans-Kantorovitch duality
theorem to a “continuum”-marginal case. Our proof is built on the proof of duality
theorem in multi-marginal transport problem in Kellerer [1984] and Dudley [2002].
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we study a game with a continuum of agents who form small groups
in order to share group surpluses. Group sizes are exogenously bounded by natural
numbers or percentiles. We prove that there exists a stable assignment, where no group
of agents can jointly do better. Conceptually, our work provides the only existence
result to this problem on our level of generality, as well as a uniform way to understand
diverse solution concepts, such as stable matching, fractional core, f-core, and epsilon-
sized core. Computationally, when there are finitely many types of players and group
sizes are finite, we reduce the number of unknowns in the problem of finding stable
35
assignments from about |I|N to about |I|, where |I| is the number of player types, N
is the maximum group size and |I| is much larger than N . We achieve this reduction
by reformulating the welfare maximization problem as a symmetric transport problem.
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A Notations
In this section, we clarify notations we used in this paper. In the following definitions,
I is always assumed to be a Polish (complete separable metric) space.
• Θ(xk): the growth rate of a function on N is exactly xk (See Remark 1)
• M+(I): the space of non-negative Borel measures on I
• P(I): the space of probability measures on I
• Sn: the set of bijective maps from {1, 2, ..., n} to itself
• USC(I): the set of upper semi-continuous continuous functions on I
• LSC(I): the set of lower semi-continuous functions on I
• C(I): the set of continuous functions on I
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• Cb(I): the set of bounded continuous functions on I
• Lip1(I): the set of 1-Lipchitz continuous functions on I
• L1(I, µ): the set of integrable functions on (I, µ)
• ‖f‖∞: the essential suppremum of the function f
• ‖ν‖: the total measure of a nonnegative measure ν on I
• µ1 ≤ µ2: µ1 is less than equal to µ2 on all measurable sets
• supp(µ): the support of measure µ, see (Remark 2)
• T#µ: the push-forward measure of µ under the map T (See Remark 3)
• Symmetric measure: a measure γ on In is symmetric if
γ(A1, ..., An) = γ(Aσ(1), ..., Aσ(n)),∀A1, ..., An ⊂ I, σ ∈ Sn
Remark 1: For a function f : N → R, f(x) = Θ(xk) if cxk ≤ f(x) ≤ Cxk for some
constants c, C > 0. Since big Θ notation characterizes functions according to their
growth rates, different functions with the same growth rate may be represented using
the same big Θ notation.
Remark 2: For a measure µ on I, supp(µ) is a closed set satisfying: 1. µ((suppµ)c) = 0.
2. for every open G intersecting supp(µ), µ(G∩supp(µ)) > 0. When I is a Polish space,
µ has a unique support.36
Remark 3: For Polish spaces I, J , a measure µ on I and a measurable function T
from I to J , T#µ is a measure on J such that for any measurable A ⊂ J , T#µ(A) =
µ(T−1(A)).37
B Omitted Proofs in Section 2
B.1 Metrizability of The Quotient space In/ ∼n
In this subsection, we show the quotient space In/ ∼n, defined in Section 2.1.2, is
metrizable. In this proof, we omit the subscript of the equivalence relation and write
it as ∼.
To start with, it is well known that the quotient space of a metric space (I, d0) is
endowed with a pseudo-metric defined by
d([x], [y]) = inf
n∑
k=1
d0(pk, qk)
36Definitions and results are taken from Aliprantis and Border [2007].
37This definition is taken from Villani [2008].
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where the choice set is given by the set of all finite sequence (pk, qk)
n
k=1 such that
pk, qk ∈ I, p1 = x, qn = y and qk ∼ pk+1 for all k ∈ N. Now, we prove the pseudo-
metric d defined above is a metric on In/ ∼n.
Lemma 9.
d([x], [y]) = min
y′∼y
d0(x, y
′)
This lemma will imply that d is a metric on the quotient space: for any y ∈ In,
there are only finite many y′ ∈ In such that y ∼ y′. Therefore, d([x], [y]) = 0 implies
d0(x, y
′) = 0 for some y′ ∼ y. Hence, x ∼ y.
Proof. Firstly, by definition, we have d([x], [y]) = d([x], [y′]) ≤ d0(x, y′) for all y′ ∼
y. Therefore, d([x], [y]) ≤ miny′∼y d0(x, y′). Now we prove the converse d([x], [y]) ≥
miny′∼y d0(x, y′). To prove the converse, we use the distance preserving property of
the permutation: the distance of two points in In are not changed if their indices are
permuted by the same permutation. Consequently, for any sequence (pk, qk)
n
k=1 in the
choice set, there is a sequence of (rk)
n
k=2 in I
n, defined inductively, such that
r1 = q1
d0(pk, qk) = d0(rk−1, rk), ∀k ≥ 2
rk ∼ qk
Therefore,
n∑
k=1
d0(pk, qk) = d0(x, r1) +
n∑
k=2
d0(rk−1, rk) ≥ d(x, rk)
Since rn ∼ qn = y,
n∑
k=1
d0(pk, qk) ≥ min
y′∼y
d0(x, y
′)
As the choice of (pk, qk)
n
k=1 in the choice set is arbitrary, the lemma is proved. 
B.2 Measurability of Gn(A, k)
In this subsection, we show the Gn(A, k), defined in Section 2.1.4, is measurable in
In/ ∼n.
Firstly, we prove for any Borel measurable A1, ..., An ⊂ I,
Z = {[i1, ..., in] : ik ∈ Ak,∀1 ≤ k ∈ n}
is Borel measurable in In/ ∼n. By definition of Borel measurability, we only need to
prove the cases that A1, ..., An are open: fix i1, ..., in ∈ A1 × A2 × ... × An, for any
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δ > 0 and [j1, ..., jn] ∈ In/ ∼n, if d([i1, ..., in], [j1, ..., jn]) < δ, by Lemma 9, there is a
permutation σ ∈ Sn such that
d0((i1, ..., in), (jσ(1), ..., jσ(n))) < δ
Therefore, dI(im, jσ(m)) < δ for all 1 ≤ m ≤ n. Here, dI is the metric in I. On the other
hand, all Am are open. By taking δ small enough, we have jσ(m) ∈ Am. Therefore,
[j1, ..., jn] ∈ Z. Consequently, Z is open, thus Borel measurable.
Next, for any 1 ≤ k ≤ n and measurable A ⊂ I, we take A1 = ... = Ak = A and
Ak+1 = ... = An = A
c, we have
Gn(A, k) = {[i1, ..., in] : ik ∈ Ak,∀1 ≤ k ∈ n}
Therefore, Gn(A, k) is Borel measurable.
B.3 Measurability of The Function c
In this subsection, we show the function c : In → R defined in Section 2.3.2 is Borel
measurable in In. Recall,
c(i1, ..., in) =
1
(n− 1)!
∏
i∈I
ni!
where ni = |{k : ik = i}|.
Since there are finitely many sequence (ni)i∈I such that, for all i ∈ I, ni ∈ N
and
∑
i∈I ni = n, the range of the function c is a finite set in R. Consequently, to
prove c is Borel measurable, it is sufficient to show for any sequence of positive integers
m1 ≥ m2 ≥ ... ≥ mk ≥ 1 such that m1 + ...+mk = n, the set
S0(m1, ...mk) = {(i1, ..., i1︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1 many
, i2, ..., i2︸ ︷︷ ︸
m2 many
, ..., ik, ..., ik︸ ︷︷ ︸
mk many
) ∈ In : i1, ..., ik are disjoint}
is Borel measurable.
To see the sufficiency, we first define a set S(m1, ...mk) to be a subset of I
n consisting
of all permuted elements in the set S0(m1, ...mk). Clearly, the cardinality of S depends
on the sequence (m1, ...mk). If S0(m1, ...mk) is measurable, we have S(m1, ...mk), as a
finite union of measurable sets, is measurable. Moreover, there are at most finitely many
decreasing sequences of positive integers (m′1, ...,m′l) such that m
′
1!...m
′
l! = m1!...mk!
and m′1 + ... + m′l = n. Therefore, the set c
−1(m1!...mk!(n−1)! ) ⊂ In is at most a finite union
of the set S(m′1, ...,m′l) over all positive decreasing sequences (m
′
1, ...,m
′
l) such that
m′1!...m′l! = m1!...mk!, thus is measurable.
Lastly, we prove, for any decreasing sequence m1 ≥ m2 ≥ ... ≥ mk ≥ 1 such that
m1 + ...+mk = n, S0(m1, ...,mk) is measurable. Firstly, the set
{(i1, ..., i1︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1 many
, i2, ..., i2︸ ︷︷ ︸
m2 many
, ..., ik, ..., ik︸ ︷︷ ︸
mk many
) ∈ In : i1, ..., ik ∈ I}
41
is Borel measurable as it is closed. In addition, S0(m1, ...,mk) is obtained by subtracting
a finite union of degenerate cases from this set, all of which are closed. Therefore,
S0(m1, ...,mk) is Borel measurable.
B.4 Proof of Lemma 1
In this subsection, we prove Lemma 1.
Firstly, it is easy to prove that the set Kn is closed in I
N !/ ∼N ! as it is a finite union
of closed set.
Moreover, for any permitted group size n, sˆn is upper semi-continuous. We prove
by contradiction. Suppose there is a sequence such that Gˆk → Gˆ in IN !/ ∼N ! such that
lim supGˆk→Gˆ sˆn(Gˆk) > sˆn(Gˆ). Firstly, when Gˆ /∈ Kn, we have Gˆk /∈ Kn for all large
enough k. Therefore, lim supGˆk→Gˆ sˆn(Gˆk) = sˆn(Gˆ) = 0, which yields contradiction.
Secondly, Gˆ ∈ Kn. Then Gˆk ∈ Kn for infinitely many large k, since otherwise the
limsup term will be zero. But sˆn ◦ Pn = sn in Kn. By the upper semi-continuity of sn,
we have
lim sup
Gˆk→Gˆ
sˆn(Gˆk) ≤ sˆn(Gˆ)
Contradiction. Recall that sˆ is defined by
sˆ = N max
(
1
N ′
sˆN ′ , ...,
1
N
sˆN
)
Therefore, sˆ is upper semi-continuous.
On the other hand, by Assumption (A2), there is a lower semi-continuous function
a ∈ L1(I, µ) such that
sn([i1, ..., in]) ≤ a(i1) + ...+ a(in)
for all N ′ ≤ n ≤ N , i1, ..., in ∈ I. Consequently,
sˆn(P
−1
n ([i1, ..., in])) ≤ a(i1) + ...+ a(in)
Moreover, since sn is non-negative, a is non-negative everywhere. Therefore, for any
[i1, ..., iN !] ∈ R0,
sˆ([i1, ..., iN !]) = 0 ≤
N !∑
k=1
a(ik)
For any [ i1, ..., i1︸ ︷︷ ︸
N !/n many
, ..., in, ..., in︸ ︷︷ ︸
N !/n many
] ∈ Rn ⊂ Kn, by the property of Rn, we have
sˆ([i1, ..., i1, ..., in, ..., in]) =
N
n
sˆn([i1, ..., i1, ..., in, ..., in]) =
N
n
sn([i1, ..., in]) ≤ N
n
n∑
k=1
a(ik)
Therefore, we define aˆ = a/(N − 1)!, we have,
sˆ([i1, ..., iN !]) ≤
N !∑
k=1
aˆ(ik)
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B.5 Proof of Lemma 3
In this subsection, we prove Lemma 3. For any S ⊂ In/ ∼n,
(Qn)#γn(S) = γn(Q
−1
n (S))
=
∫
Q−1n (S)
cd(Q#n τn)
=
∑
β∈A
∫
Q−1n (S)∩Jβ
cd(Q#n τn)
For each fixed β, by definition, Jβ = Jm,σ for some m ∈ M and σ ∈ Sn. Therefore,
c = m1!...mk!(n−1)! in Jβ and we have∫
Q−1n (S)∩Jβ
cd(Q#n τn) =
m1!...mk!
(n− 1)! Q
#
n τn(Q
−1
n (S) ∩ Jβ)
=
m1!...mk!
(n− 1)! τn(Qn(Q
−1
n (S) ∩ Jβ))
On the other hand, there are n!m1!...mk! many α ∈ A such that Qn(Q−1n (S) ∩ Jβ) =
Qn(Q
−1
n (S) ∩ Jα). We use [β] ⊂ A to denote this collection of such indices. By
definition, A can be partitioned into |M| components {[βm]}m∈M and⋃
m∈M
Qn(Q
−1
n (S) ∩ Jβm) = S
where βm is a element in [βm]. Therefore,
(Qn)#γn(S) =
∑
β∈A
∫
Q−1n (S)∩Jβ
cd(Q#n τn)
=
∑
m∈M
∑
β∈[βm]
∫
Q−1n (S)∩Jβ
cd(Q#n τn)
=
∑
m∈M
n!
m1!...mk!
· m1!...mk!
(n− 1)! τn(Qn(Q
−1
n (S) ∩ Jβm))
=
∑
m∈M
nτn(Qn(Q
−1
n (S) ∩ Jβm))
= nτn(S)
B.6 Proof of Lemma 4
In this subsection, we prove Lemma 4.
Firstly, we prove the measure γn is symmetric. For any permutation σ ∈ Sn, and
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any measurable sets A1, ..., An ⊂ I, we have
γn(Aσ(1) × ...×Aσ(n)) =
∫
Aσ(1)×...×Aσ(n)
cd(Q#n τn)
=
∑
α∈A
c(α)Q#n τn(Aσ(1) × ...×Aσ(n) ∩ Jα)
=
∑
α∈A
c(α)τn(Qn(Aσ(1) × ...×Aσ(n) ∩ Jα))
=
∑
α∈A
c(α)τn(Qn(A1 × ...×An ∩ Jα))
=
∑
α∈A
c(α)Q#n τn(A1 × ...×An ∩ Jα)
= γn(A1 × ...×An)
where {c(α)}α∈A are a collection of constant determined by the function c on the set
Jα.
The second property will be proved by using the symmetric property of γn and
Lemma 3. By Lemma 3, we have
n∑
k=0
kτn(Gn(A, k)) =
n∑
k=0
k
n
(Qn)#γn(Gn(A, k)) =
n∑
k=0
k
n
γn(Q
−1
n (Gn(A, k)))
In particular, Q−1n (Gn(A, k)) is the union of Cartesian products of k sets A and n−k sets
Ac. There are n!k!(n−k)! many such Cartesian products. Therefore, since γn is symmetric,
γn(Q
−1
n (Gn(A, k))) =
n!
k!(n− k)!γn(A× ...×A︸ ︷︷ ︸
k many
×Ac × ...×Ac︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−k many
)
On the other hand, there are (n−1)!(k−1)!(n−k)! Cartesian products of k sets A and n− k sets
Ac in the form A×S2× ...×Sn where Sj ∈ {A,Ac}. We use Sk to denote the collection
of such Cartesian products. i.e.
Sk = {A× S2 × ...× Sn : Sj ∈ {A,Ac}, |{j : Sj = A}| = k − 1}
Therefore, again by the symmetry of the measure γn,
γn(∪S∈SkS) =
(n− 1)!
(k − 1)!(n− k)!γn(A× ...×A︸ ︷︷ ︸
k many
×Ac × ...×Ac︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−k many
)
Consequently,
n∑
k=0
kτn(Gn(A, k)) =
n∑
k=0
k
n
γn(Q
−1
n (Gn(A, k))) =
n∑
k=1
γn(∪S∈SkS) = γn(∪S∈∪nk=1SkS)
Note that,
∪nk=1Sk = {A× S2 × ...× Sn : Sj ∈ {A,Ac}}
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Thus,
∪S∈∪nk=1SkS = A× I × ...× I
In conclusion,
n∑
k=0
kτn(Gn(A, k)) = γn(A× I × ...× I)
B.7 Proof of Lemma 5
In this subsection, we prove Lemma 5. We start by stating and proving the following
lemma:
Lemma 10. If S is a symmetric function,
sup
γˆ∈Γˆsym
∫
IN !
Sdγˆ = sup
γˆ∈Γˆ
∫
IN !
Sdγˆ
Proof. Since Γˆsym ⊂ Γˆ, we have
sup
γˆ∈Γˆsym
∫
IN !
Sdγˆ ≤ sup
γˆ∈Γˆ
∫
IN !
Sdγˆ
Conversely, for any γ0 ∈ Γˆ, we define
γˆ =
1
(N !)!
∑
σ∈SN !
(fσ)#γ0
where fσ : I
N ! → IN ! is defined by fσ(i1, ..., iN !) = (iσ(1), ..., iσ(N !)).
We claim γˆ is in Γˆsym and ∫
IN !
Sdγˆ =
∫
IN !
Sdγ0
We omit the routine work to check γˆ is in Γˆsym. Since S is symmetric, γ induces the
same total welfare as γ:∫
IN !
Sdγˆ =
1
(N !)!
∑
σ∈SN !
∫
IN !
Sd(fσ)#γ0 =
1
(N !)!
∑
σ∈SN !
∫
IN !
s ◦ fσdγ0
=
1
(N !)!
∑
σ∈SN !
∫
IN !
Sdγ0 =
∫
IN !
Sdγ0
Since γ0 ∈ Γˆ is arbitrary,
sup
γˆ∈Γˆsym
∫
IN !
Sdγˆ ≥ sup
γˆ∈Γˆ
∫
IN !
Sdγˆ

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By the duality theorem for multi-marginal transport problem Kellerer [1984], we
have
sup
γˆ∈Γˆ
∫
IN !
S
N
dγˆ = inf
(uj)N !j=1∈U˜
N !∑
j=1
∫
I
ujdµ
where
U˜ =
(u1, ..., uN !) ∈ (L1(I, µ))N ! :
N !∑
j=1
uj(ij) ≥ S(i1, ..., iN !)
N
, ∀i1, i2, ..., iN ! ∈ I

and the infimum could be achieved. Moreover, by Lemma 10,
sup
γˆ∈Γˆsym
∫
IN !
S
N
dγˆ = sup
γˆ∈Γˆ
∫
IN !
S
N
dγˆ
So it remains to show
inf
(uj)N !j=1∈U˜
N !∑
j=1
∫
I
ujdµ = inf
u∈Uˆ
∫
I
udµ (17)
and the infimum on the right hand side could be achieved.
Firstly, take any u ∈ Uˆ , we have (u, u, ..., u) ∈ U˜ . Therefore,
inf
(uj)N !j=1∈U˜
N !∑
j=1
∫
I
ujdµ ≤ inf
u∈Uˆ
∫
I
udµ
Conversely, for any minimizer (u∗j )
N !
j=1 ∈ U˜ solving the left hand side of Equation 17,
we define
u =
N !∑
n=1
u∗n (18)
Then, for any i1, ..., iN ! ∈ I, we have,
N !∑
j=1
u(ij) =
N !∑
j=1
N !∑
n=1
u∗n(ij) =
N !∑
j=1
[
N !−1∑
k=0
u∗j (ij+k)
]
≥ 1
N
[S(i1, ..., iN !) + S(i2, ..., iN !, i1) + ...+ S(iN !, i1, ...., iN !−1)]
= (N − 1)!S(i1, ..., iN !)
where iN !+k is defined to be ik for 1 ≤ k ≤ N ! and the last equality is implied by the
symmetry of S. Moreover, as a finite sum of upper semi-continous integrable functions,
u ∈ L1(I, µ). Thus, u ∈ U , and we have
inf
(uj)N !j=1∈U˜
N !∑
j=1
∫
I
ujdµ ≥ inf
u∈Uˆ
∫
I
udµ
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In conclusion,
inf
(uj)N !j=1∈U˜
N !∑
j=1
∫
I
ujdµ = inf
u∈Uˆ
∫
I
udµ
and u =
∑N !
n=1 u
∗
n solves the minimization problem on the right hand side of Equation
17.
B.8 Proof of Lemma 6
In this subsection, we prove Lemma 6. Firstly, take any u ∈ Uˆ and any [i1, ..., i1, i2, ..., i2, ..., in, ..., in] ∈
Kn, We have
n∑
k=1
N !
n
u(ik) ≥(N − 1)!sˆ([i1, ..., i1, i2, ..., i2, ..., in, ..., in])
≥N !
n
sˆn([i1, ..., i1, i2, ..., i2, ..., in, ..., in])
=
N !
n
sn([i1, ..., in])
Therefore, u ∈ Un. Since n is arbitrary, u ∈ U = ∩Nn=N ′Un. Conversely, take any u ∈ U ,
we check u ∈ Uˆ region by region. Firstly, take [i1, ..., iN !] ∈ R0, it is clear that
N !∑
k=1
u(ik) ≥ 0 = (N − 1)!sˆ([i1, ..., iN !])
Moreover, for any permitted group sizeN ′ ≤ n ≤ N , we take [i1, ..., i1, i2, ..., i2, ..., in, ..., in] ∈
Rn,
n∑
k=1
N !
n
u(ik) =
N !
n
n∑
k=1
u(ik)
≥ N !
n
sn([i1, ..., in])
=
N !
n
sˆn([i1, ..., i1, i2, ..., i2, ..., in, ..., in])
= (N − 1)!sˆ([i1, ..., i1, i2, ..., i2, ..., in, ..., in])
Since {R0, RN ′ , ..., RN} is a partition of IN !/ ∼N !, we have u ∈ Uˆ .
B.9 Proof of Theorem 2
Now, we finish the proof of duality theorem by proving there is a continuous minimizer
for the welfare minimization problem
inf
u∈U
∫
I
udµ (19)
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where U = {u ∈ L1(I, µ) : ∑i∈G u(i) ≥ s(G),∀G ∈ G}.
Firstly, by Lemma 5 and Lemma 6, there is a minimizer u∗ ∈ L1(I, µ) minimizing
Equation 19. On the other hand, by Lemma 7, there is a maximizer τ∗ for the welfare
maximization problem. Define µn = τ
∗(Gn). That is, µn is the type distribution
of players who are assigned to some n-person group under assignment τ∗. Clearly,∑N
n=N ′ µn = µ.
We claim that, for any permitted group size n, there is a continuous function vn ∈
C(I) ∩ Un such that vn ≤ u∗ on I and
∫
I u
∗dµn =
∫
I vndµn. We note, if the claim is
proved to be true, we can take v = max(vN ′ , ..., vN ). It is clear, as the maximum of
finitely many continuous functions, v is continuous. Moreover, as vn ∈ Un, v is in U .
By v ≤ u∗, v is also a minimizer of Equation 19.
Now, we fixed a permitted group size n and prove the claim. Our proof is based
on the trick used in the proof of Theorem 4.1.1 in Pass [2011]. This trick can also be
found in Gangbo and S´wiech [1998] and Carlier and Nazaret [2008].
We define γ∗n by τ∗n using the change of variable trick in Equation 9. By Lemma 3,∫
In
s˜n
n
dγ∗n =
∫
Gn
sndτ
∗
n
where s˜n = s◦Qn is a continuous function on In. Moreover, by the proof of equivalence
lemma in Appendix B.11,
∑
i∈G u
∗(i) = sn(G) for τ∗n-almost all G ∈ Gn. Therefore,∫
In
s˜ndγ
∗
n = n
∫
I
u∗dµn
We define n functions (w1, ..., wn) as follows:
w1(i1) = sup
ik∈I,k≥2
(
s˜n(i1, ..., ik)−
n∑
k=2
u∗(ik)
)
Inductively, for m ≥ 2,
wm(im) = sup
ik∈I,k 6=m
(
s˜n(i1, ..., ik)−
m−1∑
k=1
wk(ik)−
n∑
k=m+1
u∗(ik)
)
Inductively, by
∑n
k=1 u
∗(ik) ≥ s˜n(i1, ..., ik) for all i1, ..., ik ∈ I, we have
u∗(xk) ≥ wk(xk) (20)
for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n, xk ∈ I. Moreover, recall,
wn(in) = sup
ik∈I,k 6=n
(
s˜n(i1, ..., in)−
n−1∑
k=1
wk(ik)
)
we have for all 1 ≤ m ≤ n,
wm(im) ≥ sup
ik∈I,k 6=m
s˜n(i1, ..., in)−∑
k 6=m
wk(ik)

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The definition of wm−1 implies for all i1, ..., in ∈ I,
u∗(im) ≥ sn(i1, ..., in)−
m−1∑
k=1
u∗(ik)−
n∑
k=m+1
wk(ik)
Therefore,
wm(xm) = sup
ik∈I,k 6=m
(
s˜n(i1, ..., ik)−
m−1∑
k=1
wk(ik)−
n∑
k=m+1
u∗(ik)
)
≤ sup
ik∈I,k 6=m
s˜n(i1, ..., in)−∑
k 6=m
wk(ik)

Consequently, for all 1 ≤ m ≤ n and all i1, ..., ik ∈ I,
wm(im) = sup
ik∈I,k 6=m
s˜n(i1, ..., in)−∑
k 6=m
wk(ik)

That is, (w1, ..., wn) are s˜n-conjugate. Since s˜n is continuous and I is compact, w1, ..., wn
are continuous. Define vn =
1
n(w1 + ...+wn) ∈ C(I). By Equation 20, vn ≤ u∗. By the
symmetry of s˜n, vn ∈ Un. Moreover, as all marginals of γ∗n are µn,
n
∫
I
u∗dµn ≥
n∑
k=1
∫
I
wkdµn ≥
∫
In
s˜ndγ
∗
n
But
∫
In s˜ndγ
∗
n = n
∫
I u
∗dµn. Thus,
∫
I u
∗dµn =
∫
I vndµn. Therefore, the claim is proved.
B.10 Proof of Lemma 7
In this subsection, we prove Lemma 7. By Proposition 1 and Lemma 10, we have
sup
τ∈T
N∑
n=N ′
∫
Gn
sndτn = sup
γˆ∈Γˆsym
∫
IN !
S
N
dγˆ = sup
γˆ∈Γˆ
∫
IN !
S
N
dγˆ
We first show there is a maximizer γˆ solving the right maximization problem, then
we construct a maximizer τ for the left maximization problem.
To show the existence of a maximizer γˆ, we show Γˆ is compact and the map γˆ →∫
IN ! Sdγˆ is upper semi-continuous.
Lemma 11. Γˆ is compact in the weak-* topology.
Proof. Since I is Polish space, by Ulam’s theorem, {µ/ ‖µ‖} is tight in I. i.e. for any
ε > 0, there exists a compact set Kε, such that µ(I −Kε) < ε. Hence, Γˆ is uniformly
tight as, for any γˆ ∈ Γˆ,
γˆ(IN ! −KN ! ) ≤ N !µ(I −Kε) ≤ N !ε
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Moreover, Γˆ is uniformly bounded as, for any γˆ ∈ Γˆ, ‖γˆ‖ = ‖µ‖. By Prokhorov’s
theorem (Theorem 8.6.2 in Bogachev [2007]), Γˆ has compact closure in weak* topology.
Thus, to show Γˆ is compact, it is sufficient to show it is closed: for any convergent
sequence (γˆk)k∈N in Γˆ such that γˆk → γˆ, we have, for all measurable S ⊂ IN !,
γˆ(S) = lim
k→∞
γˆk(S)
For any measurable set A ⊂ I, by taking S to be the Cartesian product of one set A
and N !− 1 sets I, we can show all the marginals of γˆ is µ. Therefore, γˆ ∈ Γˆ. i.e. Γˆ is
closed. 
Lemma 12. The functional γˆ → ∫IN ! Sdγˆ is upper semi-continuous in the weak-*
topology.
Proof. Firstly, we claim it is without loss of generality to assume S is non-positive:
by Equation 14, S is bounded from above by the function lower-semi continuous and
integrable A : IN ! → R where
A(i1, ..., iN !) =
N !∑
j=1
aˆ(ij)
We can study s − A, which is a non-positive upper semi-continuous and integrable
function. By the non-positive upper semi-continuity, there is a decreasing sequence
of Sl converging to S pointwisely, where Sl is a continuous bounded function on I
N !.
Taking γˆk → γˆ, by monotone convergence theorem, we have∫
IN !
Sdγˆ = lim
l→∞
∫
IN !
Sldγˆ = lim
l→∞
lim
k→∞
∫
IN !
Sldγˆk ≥ lim sup
k→∞
∫
IN !
Sdγˆk

Therefore, by Lemma 11 and Lemma 12, there is a γˆ∗ ∈ Γˆ solves the maximization
problem
sup
γˆ∈Γˆ
∫
IN !
S
N
dγˆ
By the construction in Lemma 10, we have a maximizer γˆ∗sym ∈ Γˆsym. Then we repeat
the construction in Equation 15, and obtain a τ∗ = (τ∗N ′ , ..., τ
∗
N ) ∈ T such that
N∑
n=N ′
∫
Gn
sndτ
∗
n =
∫
IN !
S
N
dγˆ∗sym = sup
γˆ∈Γˆsym
∫
IN !
S
N
dγˆ = sup
τ∈T
N∑
n=N ′
∫
Gn
sndτn
i.e. τ∗ solves the maximization problem
sup
τ∈T
N∑
n=N ′
∫
Gn
sndτn
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B.11 Proof of Lemma 8
In this subsection, we prove Lemma 8. Given any maximizer τ∗ and minimizer u∗ in
the duality equation Equation 3, by u∗ ∈ U , we have the no-blocking condition:∑
i∈G
u∗(i) ≥ s(G),∀G ∈ G
For every permitted group size n, we define γ∗n by τ∗n by Equation 9. By Lemma 3, we
have
N∑
n=N ′
∫
Gn
(u∗(i1) + ...+ u∗(in)) dτ∗n =
N∑
n=N ′
∫
In
u∗(i1) + ...+ u∗(in)
n
dγ∗n
Moreover, by Lemma 4, γ∗ ∈ Γ. Therefore, we have
N∑
n=N ′
∫
In
u∗(i1) + ...+ u∗(in)
n
dγ∗n =
∫
I
u∗dµ
Consequently,∫
I
u∗dµ =
N∑
n=N ′
∫
Gn
(u∗(i1) + ...+ u∗(in)) dτ∗n ≥
N∑
n=N ′
∫
Gn
sndτ
∗
n
By the duality relation, Equation 3,∫
I
u∗dµ =
N∑
n=N ′
∫
Gn
sndτ
∗
n
Therefore,
∑
i∈G u
∗(i) ≤ s(G) for τ∗-almost all G ∈ supp(τ∗). By the continuity of u
and s, we have the feasibility condition∑
i∈G
u∗(i) ≤ s(G),∀G ∈ supp(τ∗)
That is, τ∗ is a stable assignment with imputation given by u∗.
Conversely, given a stable assignment τ∗ with an imputation u∗, we show τ∗ solves
the maximization problem and u∗ solves the minimization problem. Firstly, since u∗ ∈
U is an imputation such that there is no blocking coalitions, for any assignment τ ∈ T,
we have
N∑
n=N ′
∫
Gn
sndτn ≤
∫
I
u∗dµ
However, since τ∗ is stable, by feasibility condition,
N∑
n=N ′
∫
Gn
sndτ
∗
n ≥
∫
I
u∗dµ
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Therefore, τ∗ solves the maximization problem in Equation 3. Secondly, by the no-
blocking condition of stable assignments, for any imputation u ∈ U , we have
N∑
n=N ′
∫
Gn
sndτ
∗
n ≤
∫
I
udµ
Again by feasibility condition, we have
N∑
n=N ′
∫
Gn
sndτ
∗
n ≥
∫
I
u∗dµ
Therefore, u∗ solves the minimization problem in Equation 3.
C Omitted Proofs in Section 3
In this section, we prove Theorem 3 and Theorem 4. We use the same three-step
procedure introduced Gretsky et al. [1992] to show the existence of a stable assignment.
Firstly, we study the optimization problems and show the optimizers exist. Secondly,
we prove the duality property to link the assignment and the imputation. Lastly, we
prove the equivalence between the solutions of optimization problems and the set of
stable assignments.
Lemma 13. ΓG is a compact set in M+(G).
Proof. Since I is a Polish space, M+(I), the set of nonnegative Borel measures on I,
with weak topology on it is a Polish space by Theorem 8.9.4 in Bogachev [2007]. By
the same argument, M+(M+(I)) is a Polish space.
On the other hand, since I is a Polish space and µ is a probability measure, by
Ulam’s tightness theorem, {µ} ⊂ M(I) is tight. That is, for any δ > 0, there is a
compact set Kδ ⊂ I such that µ(I −Kδ) < δ.
Next, we show G, as a subset of M+(I), is compact. Firstly, G is uniformly tight.
Since for any δ > 0, there is a compact set Kδ ⊂ I such that |ν|(I−Kδ) ≤ µ(I−Kδ) < δ,
for all ν ∈ G. Moreover, G is uniformly bounded in variation norm as ‖ν‖ ≤ ε for all
ν ∈ G. By Prohorov’s theorem for Borel measures (Theorem 8.6.2 in Bogachev [2007]),
G has compact closure. It is routine to check G is closed. Therefore, G is compact.
Furthermore, we show ΓG is compact inM+(M+(I)). Firstly, ΓG is uniformly tight
since γ(M+(I) − G) = 0 for all γ ∈ ΓG . Moreover, the total variation norm of γ is
uniformly bounded as for all γ ∈ ΓG
γ(M+(I)) = γ(G) ≤ 1
ε′
∫
G
‖ν‖ dγ = γ(G) ≤ 1
ε′
∫
G
ν(I)dγ =
µ(I)
ε′
=
‖µ‖
ε′
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Again by Prohorov’s theorem for Borel measures, G has compact closure inM+(M+(I)).
Moreover, since the map ν → ν(A) is continuous and bounded onM+(I) for any Borel
set A ⊂ I, for any convergent sequence γn in ΓG and any Borel set A ⊂ I,
µ(A) = lim
n→∞
∫
G
ν(A)dγn =
∫
G
νdγ
Therefore, ΓG is closed. Hence, ΓG is compact. 
Lemma 14. For the cooperative game ((I, µ), s, ε′, ε) satisfying Assumption (B1) and
Assumption (B2), there is an assignment γ ∈ ΓG solving the welfare maximization
problem
sup
γ∈ΓG
∫
G
sdγ
Proof. Firstly, we prove the map γ → ∫G sdγ is upper-semi continuous onM+(M+(I))
if s is non-positive. Since s is a upper semi-continuous function and has a uniform
bound, we take a decreasing sequence of sl converging to s pointwisely, where sl is
continuous. Let γn → γ inM+(G), by the monotone convergence theorem and the fact
sl is decreasing, we have∫
G
sdγ = lim
l→∞
∫
G
sldγ = lim
l→∞
lim
n→∞
∫
G
sldγn ≥ lim sup
n→∞
∫
G
sdγn
Moreover, define a function h : G → R by h(ν) = ∫I adν. By Assumption (B2),
s − h is non-positive in G. Therefore, taking a sequence of γn ∈ ΓG approaching the
maximum, by compactness of the choice set ΓG , a subsequence of it converges to some
γ ∈ ΓG . By selecting the subsequence, we suppose γn → γ in M+(G). Therefore,∫
G
sdγ −
∫
G
hdγ ≥ lim sup
n→∞
(∫
G
sdγn −
∫
G
hdγn
)
However, we note h is continuous and bounded on G since h(ν) = ∫I adν ≤ ‖a‖∞ ‖ν‖0
and h(ν) ≤ ‖a‖∞ ε. Therefore, by the definition of weak convergence on inM+(G), we
have limn→∞
∫
G hdγn =
∫
G hdγ. Therefore,∫
G
sdγ ≥ lim sup
n→∞
∫
G
sdγn
i.e. γ is a maximizer. 
Lemma 15. For the game ((I, µ), s, ε′, ε) satisfying Assumption (B1) and Assumption
(B2), there is an imputation u ∈ U solving the payoff minimization problem
inf
u∈U
∫
I
udµ
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Proof. By By Assumption (B2), there is a function a ∈ L1(I, µ) such that ∫I adν ≥ s(ν)
for all ν ∈ G. Therefore, a ∈ U . Note that for any u ∈ U , min(u, a) ∈ U . Therefore, we
define a subset Ua ⊂ U where
Ua = {u ∈ U : 0 ≤ u ≤ ‖a‖∞}
Clearly, infu∈U
∫
I udµ = infu∈Ua
∫
I udµ as all u ∈ U is pointwisely non-negative.
Next, we define a sequence of spaces (Ua(k))k∈N in L1(µ) where
Ua(k) =
{
u ∈ Ua :
∫
I
udµ ≤ inf
u∈U
∫
I
udµ+ 1/k
}
We note for any k ∈ N, Ua(k) is non-empty. Moreover, it is uniformly integrable: for
any c > 0, we take δ = c/ ‖a‖∞ > 0. Then, for any Borel measurable E ⊂ I with
µ(E) < δ,
∫
E udµ ≤ c. By Dunford-Pettis theorem (Theorem 3 in Diestel and Uhl Jr
[1978]), the weak closure of Ua(k) is weakly compact in L1(µ). But it is easy to see
Ua(k) is closed in weak topology. Therefore, Ua(k) is non-empty, closed and compact in
L1(µ) endowed with weak topology. Note the sequence Ua(k) is decreasing, by Cantor’s
intersection theorem, ⋂
k∈N
Ua(k) 6= ∅
The element u ∈ ⋂k∈N Ua(k) has the property that ∫I udµ ≤ infI udµ. 
Next, we prove the Theorem 4. The proof is based on the proof of Theorem 11.8.2
in Dudley [2002].
Proof. For any u ∈ L1(I, µ), we define Fu : G → R by
Fu(ν) =
∫
I
udν
Since I is a metric space and µ is a finite Borel measure, Cb(I) is dense in L
1(I, µ).
Therefore, for any ν1, ν2 ∈ G and g ∈ Cb(I), we have
|Fu(ν1)− Fu(ν2)| ≤ 2 ‖u− g‖1 +
∫
I
gd(ν1 − ν2) ≤ 2 ‖u− g‖1 + ‖g‖∞ ‖ν1 − ν2‖0
Therefore, Fu is weak continuous in G. i.e. Fu ∈ C(G).
We define L to be the space containing all such function Fu. That is,
L = {Fu ∈ C(G) : u ∈ L1(I, µ)}
Since, for any c ∈ R, u1, u2 ∈ L1(I, µ), we have Fcu1+u2 = cFu1 + Fu2 , L is a linear
subspace of C(G).
Next, define H ⊂ C(G) by
H = {F ∈ C(G) : F (ν) ≥ s(ν),∀ν ∈ G}
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It is easy to see H is convex. Moreover, H is nonempty since, by Assumption (B2),
Fa ∈ H. Consequently, we also have Fa + 1 ∈ int(H).
Now, we define a linear form r on L ⊂ C(G) by
r(Fu) =
∫
I
udµ
It is easy to check r is a linear map. By Assumption (B2), L ∩H 6= ∅ as Fa ∈ L ∩H.
Moreover, r is bounded from below in L ∩H, since, for any γ ∈ ΓG ,
r(Fu) =
∫
I
udµ =
∫
G
∫
I
udνdγ ≥
∫
G
s(ν)dγ ≥
(
inf
ν∈G
s(ν)
)
γ(G)
By By Assumption (B1), s is upper-semi continuous on a compact set G, Therefore,
infν∈G s(ν) > −∞. In addition, we have 1 = µ(I) =
∫
G ν(I)dγ ≤ εγ(G). Therefore, r
is bounded from below by (infν∈G s(ν)) /ε. By Hahn-Banach theorem (Theorem 6.2.11
in Dudley [2002]), r can be extended to a linear functional r˜ on C(G) such that,
inf
F∈H
r˜(F ) = inf
F∈L∩H
r(F )
We claim r˜ is a bounded positive functional on C(G). To see the r is positive for any
F ≥ 0 in C(G) and real number c ≥ 0, we have s˜+ cF + 1 ∈ H, where s˜ is a continuous
approximation of s. Note we have
inf
F∈H
r˜(F ) = inf
F∈H∩L
r(F ) ≥ infν∈G s(ν)
ε
Therefore, by taking c large enough, we get r˜(F ) ≥ 0. To see r˜ is bounded, we note for
any F ∈ C(G), |r˜(F )| ≤ |r˜(1)| ‖F‖∞.
Hence, by Riesz representation theorem (Theorem 7.4.1 in Dudley [2002]), there
exists a positive Borel measure ρ on G such that
r˜(F ) =
∫
G
Fdρ
for any F ∈ C(G). Furthermore, we show ρ ∈ ΓG . Note r˜ = r on L, for any Borel
measurable set A ⊂ I, we take u = 1A, Fu(ν) = ν(A) and we have∫
G
ν(A)dρ = r˜(Fu) = r(Fu) =
∫
I
udµ
Therefore,
inf
u∈U
∫
I
udµ = inf
F∈H∩L
r(F ) = inf
F∈H
r˜(F ) = inf
F∈H
∫
G
Fdρ =
∫
G
sdρ ≤ sup
γ∈ΓG
∫
G
sdγ
Conversely, for any u ∈ L1(I, µ), we approximate u by step functions such that ∫I udν ≥
s(ν) for all ν ∈ G. Therefore, for any indicate function u = 1A, we have∫
I
udµ =
∫
G
∫
I
udνdγ ≥
∫
G
sdγ
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Consequently,
sup
γ∈ΓG
∫
G
vdγ ≤ inf
u∈U
∫
I
udµ

Lastly, to prove the existence of a stable assignment, we prove establish the equiv-
alence relation between duality theorem Theorem 4.
Lemma 16. Any maximizer γ ∈ ΓG in the duality equation is a stable assignment with
the imputation given by the minimizer u ∈ U .
Conversely, any stable assignment γ solves the maximization problem and the im-
putation u associated with the assignment solves the minimization problem.
Proof. Firstly, we suppose γ ∈ ΓG and u ∈ U are the solutions of the maximization and
minimization problem respectively. By definition,
∫
I udν ≥ s(ν) for all groups ν ∈ G.
In contrast, by Riesz representation theorem,∫
I
udµ =
∫
G
(∫
I
udν
)
dγ =
∫
G
sdγ
Therefore,
∫
I udν ≤ s(ν) for γ−almost all ν ∈ G.
Conversely, we take a stable assignment γ ∈ ΓG with its imputation u ∈ U . By
definition,
∫
I udν ≥ s(ν) for all ν ∈ G, and
∫
I udν ≤ v(ν), for γ-almost all ν ∈ G.
Therefore, by Riesz representation theorem,∫
G
sdγ =
∫
G
∫
I
udνdγ =
∫
I
udµ
For any y ∈ U , we have that ∫I ydν ≥ s(ν) for all ν ∈ G. As a result,∫
I
udµ =
∫
G
sdγ ≤
∫
G
∫
I
ydνdγ =
∫
I
ydµ
That is, u solves the minimization problem. For any τ ∈ ΓG ,∫
G
sdτ ≤
∫
G
∫
I
udνdτ =
∫
I
udµ =
∫
G
sdγ
That is, γ solves the maximization problem. 
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